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PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ARBITRATION:
CONTRACTING OUT OF GOVERNMENT'S
ROLE IN PUNISHMENT AND FEDERAL
PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW
STEPHEN J. WARE*
INTRODUCTION
T HERE has been a fierce debate among courts and commentators
about when arbitrators may award punitive damages.' The reso-
lution of this debate will have great practical consequences and will
turn on answers to fundamental questions of political philosophy and
constitutional theory. The practical importance of the debate over pu-
nitive damages in arbitration has rapidly increased as punitive dam-
ages awards have grown in size and frequency,2 and courts have
expanded the authority of arbitrators to hear claims for which puni-
tive damages are often available.3 There is, quite bluntly, a lot of
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University.
B.A., 1987, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1990, University of Chicago. Thanks to
Randy Barnett, Bruce Hay, Tom Stipanowich, Andy Morriss, Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Kenneth Redden, Lisa Bernstein, George Wright, Larry Kramer, Henry
Strickland, Tom Berg, Andy Klein, Trisha Olson, Mike DeBow, Mike Floyd, Albert
Brewer, David Langum, Tom Gallanis and the Institute for Humane Studies. This
Article was written with support from a summer research grant provided by the Cum-
berland School of Law, Samford University.
1. Ian R. Macneil et al., Federal Arbitration Law § 36.3.1 (1994). This recently
published treatise by Ian R. Macneil, Richard E. Speidel, and Thomas J. Stipanowich,
with contributions by G. Richard Shell, is an invaluable resource for anyone inter-
ested in arbitration law.
2. The extent of this growth is hotly debated. Compare James B. Sales & Ken-
neth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 Vand.
L. Rev. 1117, 1154 (1984) ("The amount of punitive damages awarded in recent years
... has escalated to astronomical figures that boggle the mind.") and Mark A. Peter-
son et al., Punitive Damages-Empirical Findings (1987) (finding that the incidence
of punitive damages and the amount of money awarded for punitive damages have
increased substantially over the years) with Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth
and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 63 (1990) (challenging "wide-
spread beliefs that punitive damages are awarded routinely, and in large amounts,
[and] that the frequency and size of these awards are rapidly increasing").
3. Macneil et al., supra note 1, § 36.3.1. For examples of the controversy this ex-
pansion of arbitral authority has generated, see Margaret A. Jacobs, Woman Claims
Arbiters of Bias are Biased, Too, Wall St. J., Sept. 19, 1994, at B1 (discussing arbitra-
tion of sex, race and age discrimination claims); Margaret A. Jacobs, Men's Club:
Riding Crop and Slurs: How Wall Street Dealt With a Sex-Bias Case, Wall St. J., June
9, 1994, at Al (same). In August 1994, bills were introduced in both houses of Con-
gress to render unenforceable predispute arbitration agreements with respect to vari-
ous discrimination claims. See S. 2405, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); H.R. 4981, 103rd
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
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money riding on the eventual shape of the law governing punitive
damages in arbitration.'
These crass practical concerns are inextricably linked to at least
three venerable theoretical questions. The most basic question of
political philosophy-"What is the proper role of government?"- is
raised by the award of punitive damages in arbitration. Courts are an
arm of government. Arbitration, to the extent it resolves disputes that
would otherwise be resolved by courts, reduces government's role.
Punitive damages are generally viewed as an expression of society's
outrage against particularly heinous conduct.5 They are quasi-crimi-
nal.6 Allowing arbitrators to award punitive damages privatizes a
function many feel is quintessentially public. 7 In contrast, this Article
contends that allowing parties to privatize that function, as a matter of
freedom of contract, is both good policy and compelled by current
arbitration law.
The second theoretical question raised by the award of punitive
damages in arbitration is a basic problem of federalism-how to deal
with conflicting federal and state law. Here too, an appealing answer
is freedom of contract, allowing parties to choose whether to be gov-
4. See, e.g., Punitive Award Survey, Sec. Arb. Commentator, May 1993, at 1, 7.
5. In most jurisdictions, the court will award:
punitive damages because of the positive public policy to punish the defend-
ant and to serve as a warning or example to others who may commit similar
outrageous acts in the future. These public policy grounds are also found to
be in the interest of society and for the public benefit.
Linda L. Schlueter & Kenneth R. Redden, Punitive Damages § 2.1(C) (2d ed. 1989)
(citation omitted).
6. Id. § 2.2(A)(1) ("In modern law, the concept of punishment is embraced by
criminal law for the protection of society. In contrast, civil law is designed to indem-
nify the plaintiff so as to make him whole. It is because of these distinctions that
punitive damages often cross a fine line.").
7. "The problem arises because an arbitrator resolves disputes that are basically
private in nature, whereas punitive damages are awarded to punish and deter miscon-
duct for the public benefit." Id. § 4.5(C) (citing Timothy E. Travers, Annotation, Ar-
bitrator's Power To Award Punitive Damages, 83 A.L.R.3d 1037 (1978)). See, e.g.,
Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 794 (N.Y. 1976). In Garrity, the court
declared:
Punitive damages is a sanction reserved to the State, a public policy of such
magnitude as to call for judicial intrusion to prevent its contravention. Since
enforcement of an award of punitive damages as a purely private remedy
would violate strong public policy, an arbitrator's award which imposes puni-
tive damages should be vacated.
Id.
Privatizing the decision to award punitive damages will undoubtedly seem like an-
other step down the wrong path to those who "assert that quality solutions are more
likely to emerge when the dispute resolution process is not privatized and individual-
ized." Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the
Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 485, 487 (1985) (citing Richard
L. Abel, The Contradictions of Informal Justice, in The Politics of Informal Justice 267
(R. Abel ed., 1982); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L. J. 1073, 1075 (1984)
(discussing the potential role of alternate dispute resolution centers); Judith Resnik,
Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374 (1982)).
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erned by state or federal law. And current positive law allows them to
do just that with respect to federal and state arbitration law.' This
unusual form of federal preemption may have great untapped poten-
tial for arbitration and other areas of the law.
The third theoretical question raised by the award of punitive dam-
ages in arbitration goes to the nature of the due process protections
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. The Due Process Clauses restrict government,
not private, action.9 Is there sufficient government action in court en-
forcement of an arbitrator's punitive damages award to implicate the
Due Process Clauses? This Article suggests that, under present state
action doctrine, there is not. If, on the other hand, there is sufficient
state action to trigger due process protections, have these protections
been waived by one who enters into an otherwise enforceable arbitra-
tion agreement? In other words, do arbitration agreements contract
out of due process requirements? Yes, this Article suggests, they do.
The conclusion that there are no due process constraints on arbitral
punitive damages awards, however, should not be disturbing because
arbitration law and contract law provide courts with the tools neces-
sary to prevent enforcement of outlandish arbitral awards.1"
Part I of this Article emphasizes that the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"),11 by its terms and as interpreted by the Supreme Court, re-
quires the enforcement of arbitration agreements' 2 unless there is a
defense to the enforcement of any contract, such as fraud or duress.
Therefore, in the absence of such a defense, whether an arbitrator of a
given dispute has the power to award punitive damages depends on
the agreement by which the parties submitted the dispute to arbitra-
tion. If the arbitration agreement expressly confers on the arbitrator
the power to award punitive damages, courts must enforce that agree-
ment. Likewise, if the arbitration agreement expressly denies the ar-
bitrator the power to award punitive damages, courts must enforce
that agreement. If the arbitration agreement does not expressly ad-
dress punitive damages, then, in accordance with the usual methods of
contractual interpretation, other terms in the agreement must be ex-
amined to determine whether the arbitrator has the power to award
them. In other words, the language of the arbitration agreement
might impliedly address punitive damages. If, however, there is noth-
ing at all in the language of the arbitration agreement that can plausi-
bly be construed as addressing the arbitrator's power to award
8. See infra notes 97-120 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
11. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1988).
12. The term "arbitration agreement" is used herein to encompass, not just the
particular contract term pertaining to arbitration, but all the terms of the parties' con-
tract. In other words, "arbitration agreement" refers to the container contract as well
as the arbitration clause it contains.
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punitive damages, then a default rule must be supplied by the courts.
The federal policy favoring arbitration supports a default rule allowing
arbitrators to award punitive damages.
Part II of this Article addresses state arbitration law. The FAA's
command that arbitration agreements be enforced leads to notewor-
thy conclusions about the relationship between federal and state arbi-
tration law. The FAA rests on the authority of Congress to enact
substantive law under the Constitution's Commerce Clause 13 and ap-
plies if the pertinent arbitration agreement evidences a transaction in-
volving interstate commerce. 14  Because the FAA requires
enforcement of arbitration agreements, any state law purporting to
limit freedom of contract with respect to the arbitrability of punitive
damages conflicts with the FAA and is preempted by it. But if the
parties choose in their agreement to be governed by state law on the
arbitrability of punitive damages, courts must apply that state law
even though the agreement involves interstate commerce. In such a
situation, state law would ultimately govern the punitive damages
question even though, as an initial matter, federal law is controlling.
This is so because federal law incorporates the parties' agreement
which, in turn, incorporates state law. Federal preemption of state law
is unusual in the arbitration context because FAA preemption of state
arbitration law is a default rule rather than a mandatory rule.15 In
other words, the parties to an arbitration agreement can choose
whether to be governed by federal or state arbitration law.
This Article's third and final part addresses constitutional chal-
lenges to the award of punitive damages in arbitration. These chal-
lenges have been based on the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. This Article suggests that these challenges
fail for at least two reasons: first, because there is no state action in
the arbitral award of punitive damages, and, second, because due pro-
cess rights are waived by entering into an otherwise enforceable arbi-
tration agreement.
I. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. The FAA: Freedom of Contract for Arbitration Agreements
Whether an arbitrator has the power to award punitive damages
becomes an issue if an arbitrator awards punitive damages and the
13. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
14. See infra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
15. Some scholars use the term "immutable rule" rather than "mandatory rule."
See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 87 (1989) ("[Dlefault rules fill the
gaps in incomplete contracts; they govern unless the parties contract around them.
Immutable rules cannot be contracted around; they govern even if the parties attempt
to contract around them.").
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party ordered to pay does not do so. 6 If this occurs, the issue can
come before a court if the party who prevailed in arbitration applies
to the court for an order confirming the arbitral award," or if the
party ordered to pay seeks an order vacating or correcting the
award. 18
16. An arbitrator's power to award damages can also become an issue prior to
arbitration. This will be the case, for example, if a party contends that a dispute
should be litigated, rather than arbitrated, because the dispute involves claims for
punitive damages and contends that arbitrators are not, or should not be, permitted to
hear such claims. See, e.g., DiCrisci v. Lyndon Guar. Bank, 807 F. Supp. 947, 953
(W.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that employee's Title VII claim was arbitrable but that pu-
nitive damages claim had to be severed).
17. Confirmation is the usual procedure by which final arbitral awards are con-
verted into court judgments. Macneil et al., supra note 1, § 38.1.1. Section 9 of the
FAA provides, in pertinent part:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court
shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall
specify the court, then at any time within one year after the award is made
any party to the arbitration may apply to the court so specified for an order
confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an order
unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections
10 and 11 of this title. If no court is specified in the agreement of the parties,
then such application may be made to the United States court in and for the
district within which such award was made.
9 U.S.C. § 9 (1988). The FAA governs only arbitration arising out of agreements
evidencing a transaction involving interstate commerce. See infra notes 20-24 and
accompanying text. Whether Section 9 governs state courts is not clear, but, even if it
does not, state courts still have the power, derived from state arbitration law, to con-
firm awards arising out of agreements involving interstate commerce. Macneil et al.,
supra note 1, § 38.1.8.
18. Section 10 of the FAA provides, in pertinent part:
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon
the application of any party to the arbitration-
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators,
or either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to post-
pone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evi-
dence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior
by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly exe-
cuted them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement
required the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discre-
tion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988). With respect to awards arising out of arbitration agreements
evidencing transactions involving interstate commerce, "the FAA preempts any state
grounds for vacation unless the parties have clearly agreed to be bound by them."
Macneil et al., supra note 1, § 40.1. Section 11 of the FAA allows courts to correct
arbitral awards "[wihere the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to
them" and for other reasons not relevant to this discussion. 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1988).
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The primary substantive provision of the FAA is Section 2.19 It pro-
vides that:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evi-
dencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or
the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agree-
ment in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy aris-
ing out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.20
Because "commerce" is defined as interstate commerce2 1 and ex-
cludes certain employment contracts,22 Section 2 provides that arbitra-
tion agreements (other than excluded employment contracts)
evidencing a transaction involving interstate commerce 23 are "en-
forceable, save upon such grounds as exist ... for the revocation of
any contract. 24
19. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983). Accord Macneil et al., supra note 1, § 5.3.1.
20. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
21. "[Cjommerce", as herein defined, means commerce among the several
States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in
the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or be-
tween any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the
District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation, but noth-
ing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, rail-
road employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce.
9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). With respect to international arbitration, see 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08
(1988) (adopting Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign arbitral
Awards of June 9, 1958) and 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-07 (1992) (adopting Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration).
22. The final clause in 9 U.S.C. § 1 is the labor exemption to the FAA. See Mac-
neil et al., supra note 1, § 11.2.1. Agreements to arbitrate in certain employment con-
tracts-generally collective bargaining agreements-are enforceable, not under the
FAA, but under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). 29
U.S.C. §§ 152(2), 185 (1988). This Article does not discuss punitive damages in arbi-
tration arising out of agreements governed by the LMRA. For a discussion of puni-
tive damages in labor arbitration, see Linda L. Schlueter & Kenneth R. Redden,
Punitive Damages § 4.5(D)(2) (2d ed. 1989). There are federal statutes, other than
the FAA and LMRA, relating to arbitration, but they do not affect the issues ad-
dressed in this Article. See Macneil et al., supra note 1, § 12.
23. For a thorough analysis of the FAA's interstate commerce requirement, see
Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act's Interstate Commerce Requirement:
What's Left For State Arbitration Law?, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 385, 411-12 (1992). See
also Macneil et al., supra note 1, §§ 9.5.3-.5.4 (addressing the Supreme Court's expan-
sive interpretation of "transaction involving commerce"); Zhaodong Jiang, Federal
Arbitration Law and State Court Proceedings, 23 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 473, 482-88 (1990)
(analyzing the reach of Section 2). The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a
case involving the FAA's interstate commerce requirement. See Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 628 So. 2d 354 (Ala. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct.
1292 (1994).
24. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
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The significance of Section 2 is apparent in light of the historical
reluctance of courts to enforce arbitration agreements, particularly
agreements to arbitrate future disputes.' The judicial hostility to ar-
bitration agreements has been generally understood as a product of
government courts' desire to weaken private sector competition for
the dispute-resolution business.26 Courts did often enforce arbitral
awards where the parties had completed arbitration, and nineteenth
century arbitration statutes somewhat increased the enforceability of
executory arbitration agreements. 27 "But until the New York Arbitra-
tion Act of 1920 and the United States Arbitration Act (FAA), en-
acted by Congress in 1925, agreements to arbitrate future disputes
were almost always unenforceable in the United States."''
In light of this history, the FAA's core is freedom of contract with
respect to arbitration agreements in order to prevent government
courts from weakening their private sector competitors by refusing to
enforce arbitration agreements.
The FAA was designed "to overrule the judiciary's long-standing
refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate" ... and to place such
agreements "'upon the same footing as other contracts. . ... "
While Congress was no doubt aware that the Act would encourage
the expeditious resolution of disputes, its passage "was motivated,
first and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements
into which parties had entered. 2
9
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the FAA "simply
requires courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbi-
trate, like other contracts, in accordance with their terms." 30 Thus,
the FAA requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements that pro-
25. Macneil et al., supra note 1, § 4.1.2. See generally Ian R. Macneil, American
Arbitration Law: Reformation, Nationalization, Internationalization ch. 2 (1992)
[hereinafter Macneil, American Arbitration law].
26. Judicial hostility to executory agreements to arbitrate was due to the "desire of
the judges, at a time when their salaries came largely from fees, to avoid loss of in-
come." Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983 (2d Cir.
1942) (Frank, J.). See Macneil et al., supra note 1, § 4.2.2.1 n.17; Clinton W. Francis,
The Structure of Judicial Administration and the Development of Contract Law in Sev-
enteenth-Century England, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 35, 134 (1983).
27. Macneil et al., supra note 1, § 4.1.2.
28. Id-
29. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (citations omitted). "Arbitration agreements are
purely matters of contract, and the effect of the bill is simply to make the contracting
party live up to his agreement.... An arbitration agreement is placed upon the same
footing as other contracts, where it belongs." H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
1 (1924).
30. Volt, 489 U.S. at 478. See also Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S.
213, 221 (1985) ("The preeminent concern of Congress in passing the [FAA] was to
enforce private agreements into which parties had entered, and that concern requires
that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate."); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (finding that Section 2 thus "mandated the enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements").
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vide an arbitrator with the power to award punitive damages. Like-
wise, the FAA requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements that
withhold an arbitrator's power to award punitive damages. In short,
whether an arbitrator has the power to award punitive damages de-
pends on the pertinent arbitration agreement.3'
B. Application to Various Agreements
1. Express Terms
It is quite simple for a court to determine whether an arbitral award
of punitive damages should be confirmed or vacated if the arbitration
agreement expressly states whether or not the arbitrator is empow-
ered to award punitive damages. If an arbitration agreement ex-
pressly states that the arbitrator has that power, then a court must
confirm the punitive damages award. Likewise, if an arbitration
agreement expressly states that the arbitrator does not have that
power, then a court must vacate the punitive damages award. 32 Many
arbitration agreements, however, do not expressly address the ques-
tion of whether punitive damages may be awarded.33
31. Cf. Volt, 489 U.S. at 476 ("There is no federal policy favoring arbitration under
a certain set of procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceabil-
ity, according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate.").
32. "If the arbitration clause plainly states that the arbitrators have no power to
award punitive damages, that ends the matter," E. Allan Farnsworth, Punitive Dam-
ages in Arbitration, 20 Stetson L. Rev. 395, 408 (1991), unless one of the parties is a
member of a national securities exchange, in which case exchange rules may prohibit
such an agreement. See Marilyn B. Cane, Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration:
The Interplay of State and Federal Law (or a Smaller Bite of the Big Apple), 1993 J.
Disp. Resol. 153, 167-68 (1993) (arguing that terms denying arbitrator power to award
punitive damages should not be enforced in securities broker-customer context); Ste-
phen H. Kupperman & George C. Freeman III, Selected Topics in Securities Arbitra-
tion, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 1547, 1597, 1602 (1991). For instance, the New York Stock
Exchange rules provide that "[n]o agreement shall contain any condition which limits
the ability . . . of the arbitrators to make any award." NYSE Rule 636(d), 2
N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2636, at 4328 (Nov. 1992). See also NASD Rules of Fair
Practice art. III, § 21 (f)(4), NASD Manual (CCH) 91 2171, at 2095-4 (Jan. 1993). The
Securities and Exchange Commission interprets these rules as prohibiting waivers of
punitive damages. Adoption of Rule Changes to Securities Arbitration Rules, Ex-
change Act Release No. 26,805, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) I
84,414, at 80,113 (May 10, 1989) ("If punitive damages ... would be available under
applicable law, then the agreement cannot limit . . . arbitrators' rights to award
them.").
33. Farnsworth, supra note 32, at 410 (citing Stephen Bond, How to Draft an Arbi-
tration Clause, J. Int'l Arb., June 1989, at 65). Arbitration agreement terms expressly
addressing punitive damages may be becoming more common. See, e.g., James W.
Durham, et al., ADR More Than a Means of Resolving Disputes, Corp. Legal Times,
May 1994, at 1 (reporting that corporate counsel revise arbitration agreements "as the
issues of punitive damages have come up"). For an example of an arbitration agree-
ment term expressly addressing punitive damages, see John F. Dolan, Uniform Com-
mercial Code: Terms and Transactions in Commercial Law 81 (1991).
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2. Implied Terms
If the arbitration agreement does not expressly address the arbi-
trability of punitive damages, then, in accordance with the usual meth-
ods of contractual interpretation, other terms in the agreement must
be examined to determine whether the arbitrator has the power to
award punitive damages. An agreement may impliedly address puni-
tive damages. For instance, many arbitration agreements incorporate
the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association. One
of those rules, Rule 43, is entitled "Scope of Award" and provides that
"[t]he arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that the Arbitrator
deems just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the
parties including but not limited to, specific performance of the con-
tract. ' '3 4 Courts have sensibly relied on the incorporation of this rule
(or earlier versions of it) in arbitration agreements to conclude that
those agreements impliedly empower arbitrators to award punitive
damages.3 5
An example of language impliedly denying an arbitrator the power
to award punitive damages is: "The arbitrator may grant no remedy
other than compensatory damages." This hypothetical language does
not expressly address punitive damages, but it impliedly waives them
along with other remedies like reformation, rescission or specific
performance.
Some courts refuse to find that parties have impliedly given their
arbitrator the power to award punitive damages; these courts insist
that arbitrators may award punitive damages only if the arbitration
agreement expressly authorizes punitive damages. 6 These courts
34. Macneil et al., supra note 1, § 36.3.2.3.
35. See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, 943 F.2d 1056, 1063 n.6 (9th Cir.
1991); Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1989);
Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378 (11th Cir. 1988); Willoughby
Roofing & Supply Co., v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp 353, 358 (N.D. Ala. 1984),
aff'd, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985).
36. See, e.g., Complete Interiors, Inc. v. Behan, 558 So. 2d 48, 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990) (holding that arbitrator exceeded his power by awarding punitive dam-
ages in absence of express agreement between the parties); see also Bonar, 835 F.2d at
1388-89 (Tjoflat, J., concurring) ("I have difficulty, however, understanding how puni-
tive damages can ever be considered 'within the scope of the agreement of the parties'
absent some express provision in the contract."); Edward Elec. Co. v. Automation,
Inc., 593 N.E.2d 833, 842-43 (III. App. Ct. 1992) (finding that arbitrators may award
punitive damages only where expressly authorized by the arbitration agreement);
Douglas R. Davis, Note, Overextension of Arbitral Authority: Punitive Damages and
Issues of Arbitrability, 65 Wash. L. Rev. 695 (1990) (asserting that arbitrators should
interpret broadly-drafted arbitration clauses to encompass only traditional contract
remedies).
James Hadden puts State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Blevins, 551 N.E.2d 955 (Ohio
1990), in the category of cases prohibiting arbitral awards of punitive damages in the
absence of an express term authorizing them. See James Hadden, Note, The Author-
ity of Arbitrators to Award Punitive Damages, 7 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 337, 344-
45 (1992). Hadden's interpretation of Blevins may be somewhat misleading. Blevins
involved an insurance policy providing coverage for "damages for bodily injury an
1994]
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generally begin with the misunderstanding that the parties have sub-
mitted to arbitration only breach of contract claims. Because punitive
damages are not normally available for such claims,37 these courts will
not find that the parties have agreed to punitive damages unless there
is express language to that effect in the arbitration agreement.3 8 Once
one realizes that non-contract claims (for which punitive damages
would be available in court) also have been submitted to arbitration,
there is no reason to presume that the parties have chosen to deny the
arbitrator the power to award punitive damages.
3. Default Rules
When there is no term expressly addressing the arbitrability of puni-
tive damages, courts properly look for terms impliedly addressing it.
Suppose, however, there is nothing at all in the language of the arbi-
insured is legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor
vehicle." 551 N.E.2d at 956. After an auto accident, the insureds demanded arbitra-
tion against the insurer. The arbitration panel concluded that the insureds were le-
gally entitled to compensatory and punitive damages from the uninsured motorist
and, therefore, were entitled to that amount of damages from the insurer. The
Supreme Court of Ohio subsequently affirmed a lower court ruling that vacated the
arbitral "punitive damages" award. The Supreme Court of Ohio did so because "in
the absence of specific contractual language, coverage for punitive or exemplary dam-
ages will not be presumed under a provision for uninsured motorist coverage." Id. at
959. This is not a holding that arbitrators may only award punitive damages when the
arbitration agreement expressly authorizes them to do so. It is a holding that the
insurance policy should not be interpreted (by either a court or an arbitrator) to in-
clude coverage for punitive damages. While Blevins did "hold that the arbitrators
exceeded their power when they made an award for punitive damages," id., the
Supreme Court of Ohio's reasoning would lead to the conclusion that a court award-
ing punitive damages under the same agreement had exceeded its powers. In short,
Blevins is a case about the interpretation of an insurance policy, not about the scope
of arbitrators' remedial power.
37. Schlueter & Redden, supra note 22, § 7.0 ("It is well established that punitive
damages cannot be recovered for a mere breach of contract."). As Judge Richard
Posner said in affirming the confirmation of an arbitral punitive damages award,
Occasional statements that punitive damages are disfavored in arbitration
... must be read in context. Most arbitrations concern contract interpreta-
tion, and it is untraditional and still infrequent to award punitive damages
for breach of contract.... Here we have the unusual case of tort arbitration,
and punitive damages are commonly awarded for certain torts.
Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 710 (7th Cir. 1994).
38. See Farnsworth supra note 32, at 401-04. Complete Interiors, Inc. v. Behan
suggests that only express language can support an arbitral punitive damages award.
However, to support this assertion, the court cites cases that are inapposite because
they are labor arbitration cases decided under the LMRA, not the FAA. 558 So. 2d at
51. Only labor cases are cited by Schlueter & Redden for the proposition that "some
courts have held that an arbitrator can award punitive damages, but only when the
express language of the contract so permits." Schlueter & Redden, supra note 22,
§ 4.5(C) n.15. See also Michael L. Collyer, Note, Punitive Damages in Arbitration:
The Second Circuit on a Collision Course With the U.S. Supreme Court, 8 Ohio St. J.
on Disp. Resol. 385, 395 (1993) ("The trend in the arbitration of labor law cases has
been to allow arbitration of punitive damages issues only when the contract explicitly
authorizes such power.").
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tration agreement that can plausibly be construed as addressing the
arbitrator's power to award punitive damages. What is the default
rule to fill the gap in the agreement? The Supreme Court has consist-
ently stated "that questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a
healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration,"39 and "am-
biguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself [are] resolved
in favor of arbitration."'  This "federal policy favoring arbitration"
constitutes a default rule to fill the gap in an arbitration agreement,
which does not in any way indicate whether the arbitrator is empow-
ered to award punitive damages.4 Courts have properly held "that
federal policy in favor of a broad view of arbitrability supports the
power of arbitrators to award punitive damages.142 But too much
should not be read into the federal policy favoring arbitration. It is
merely a "tie-breaker," an answer to the question posed by an arbitra-
tion agreement that is silent on the issue at hand, whether that issue is
the arbitrability of punitive damages or anything else. The federal
policy favoring arbitration does not come into play when the express
or implied terms of the arbitration agreement speak to the issue.43
39. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983). See also Volt Info. Sciences v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ. 489 U.S. 468, 475-76 (1989).
40. Volt, 489 U.S. at 476.
41. This default rule can be justified on efficiency grounds even if the alternative
default rule (prohibiting punitive damages in arbitration) is preferred by most parties
whose contracts are silent on the issue. Ayres and Gertner coined the term "penalty
default" to describe a default rule purposely set contrary to what most parties would
want. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 15, at 91. "Penalty defaults are designed to give
at least one party to the contract an incentive to contract around the default rule .... "
Id. The benefit of providing this incentive to contract around the default rule is that
it encourages the production of information. Id. at 97-98.
Consider, for instance, the arbitration agreements between a securities brokerage
firm and its customers. Assume that the brokerage firm will prefer a rule against
arbitral awards of punitive damages because arbitrators order brokerage firms to pay
punitive damages to customers more often than vice-versa. As a "repeat player" us-
ing the same form contract with each of its customers, the brokerage firm is more
likely than its customer to know the default rule on punitive damages in arbitration.
An efficiency argument can be made for application of the default rule against the
brokerage firm on the ground that this will give the more informed party an incentive
to contract around the rule. This, in turn, will generate information for the relatively
uninformed customer. Id at 98. In other words, the contract terms will reveal to the
customer whether or not the brokerage firm proposes to deny the arbitrator the
power to award punitive damages.
42. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, 943 F.2d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir. 1991) (cit-
ing Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1387 (11th Cir. 1988)). See
Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 752 F. Supp. 151, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1990),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 948 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1991); Singer v. E.F. Hutton &
Co., 699 F. Supp. 276, 278-79 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Ehrich v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.,
675 F. Supp. 559, 565 (D.S.D. 1987); Willis v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 569 F.
Supp. 821, 824 (M.D:N.C. 1983).
43. Use of the federal policy favoring arbitration as a default rule that supports
the arbitrability of punitive damages has been both defended, see Michael L. Collyer,
Note, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: The Second Circuit on a Collision Course with
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C. Resistance to Freedom of Contract
If an arbitration agreement-by express terms, implied terms, or
the default rule-empowers an arbitrator to award punitive damages,
the issue has been resolved as far as (non-constitutional) federal law is
concerned.' But if an arbitration agreement-by express or implied
terms-denies an arbitrator the power to award punitive damages, an
additional issue arises: may a court award punitive damages on the
claim or has the right to recover them been waived altogether?
The best answer is "waived altogether."45 In agreeing to arbitrate,
parties waive their rights to court-ordered relief (except confirmation
of arbitral awards) and create a right to arbitrator-ordered relief.
Then, in denying the arbitrator the power to award punitive damages,
the parties waive a portion of the newly created right to arbitrator-
ordered relief. This second waiver (of some arbitrator-ordered relief)
cannot plausibly be interpreted as reversing the first waiver (of all
court-ordered relief).
Ian Macneil et al. disagree and assert that an arbitration agreement
denying the arbitrator the power to award punitive damages does not
preclude a court from awarding them. According to Macneil et al.,
there is "no justification for interpreting an ordinary arbitration clause
as a waiver of substantive rights-it is a waiver of the right to normal
judicial processes, and that is all."46 It is true that there is no justifica-
tion for interpreting an "ordinary arbitration clause" as foreclosing
the possibility of punitive damages if the term "ordinary arbitration
the U.S. Supreme Court, 8 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 385 (1993), and criticized. See
Joseph P. Lakatos & Thomas G. Stenson, Note, Punitive Damages Under the Federal
Arbitration Act: Have Arbitrators' Remedial Powers Been Circumscribed By State
Law?, 7 St. John's J. Legal Comment. 661 (1992).
Lakatos and Stenson agree that the arbitrability of punitive damages is a matter of
contract so express terms in the contract govern and, if there are no relevant express
terms, other contract terms may provide an answer by implication. Id. at 675-78. Fur-
thermore, they agree that a default rule is necessary if the terms of the arbitration
agreement do not address punitive damages, even by implication. Id. at 678-79. But,
they have an unusual proposal for the default rule.
Lakatos and Stenson contend that "courts should preliminarily recognize" state law
on the arbitrability of punitive damages as the default rule. Id. at 678. But then "fur-
ther inquiry must be made to ensure [the state law's] consistency with the underlying
goals and policies of the FAA." Id. at 679. For example, state law prohibiting arbitral
punitive damages awards is inconsistent with the FAA and "should be preempted."
Id. As part II of this Article explains, use of state law on the arbitrability of punitive
damages as a default rule (or otherwise) in arbitration arising out of transactions in
interstate commerce is unwarranted.
44. Part II will address state law and part III will address constitutional require-
ments of due process.
45. For cases treating agreements to arbitrate as waivers of the right to recover
punitive damages in any forum, see Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,
812 F. Supp. 845, 846-47 (N.D. I11. 1993) (citing cases), aff'd, 20 F.3d 713 (7th Cir.),
cert. granted, 63 U.S.L.W. 3064 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1994); Waltman v. Fahnestock & Co., 792
F. Supp. 31, 33-34 (E.D. Pa. 1992), aff'd, 989 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1993).
46. Macneil et al., supra note 1, § 36.3.2.2
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clause" refers to a clause that does not (expressly or impliedly) deny
the arbitrator the power to award punitive damages. Such a clause
transfers from courts to arbitrators the power to decide whether to
award punitive damages. If, however, an arbitration agreement de-
nies the arbitrator the power to award punitive damages, then the par-
ties have waived their rights both to judicial resolution of their claims
and to the award of punitive damages.47 Section 2 of the FAA re-
quires courts to enforce this waiver of the right to recover punitive
damages just as it requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements in
other respects, that is, "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract."'4 8
Macneil et al.'s assertion that agreeing to arbitrate is a waiver of
normal judicial processes, but not a waiver of substantive rights, sets
up a false dichotomy. A waiver of the right to normal judicial
processes necessarily entails a waiver of substantive rights unless
courts vacate arbitral awards when arbitrators make errors of law.
That courts confirm arbitral awards even when arbitrators make er-
rors of law49 shows that arbitration agreements constitute waivers of
47. An arbitration agreement could conceivably deny the arbitrator the power to
award punitive damages, but preserve the right to recover them in court. This would
require arbitration of liability and nonpunitive damages issues followed by judicial
resolution of claims for punitive damages. This bifurcation has been considered by
commentators, see Commercial and Federal Litigation Section of the New York State
Bar Association, Report on Punitive Damages in Commercial Arbitration 24 (1990),
and has occurred in New York. See DiCrisci v. Lyndon Guar. Bank, 807 F. Supp. 947,
953 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (severing claim for punitive damages pending completion of
arbitration); see also Mulder v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, 611 N.Y.S. 2d 1019,
1021 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (plaintiff's "appropriate recourse was to wait for a favorable
award from the arbitrators, and then bring a plenary action in this court for punitive
damages"); Singer v. Salomon Bros. Inc., 593 N.Y.S.2d 927, 930 (Sup. Ct. 1992) ("At
the conclusion of the arbitration, this court may award punitive damages, if proper.").
This bifurcation, however, is "entirely unsatisfactory. Given the nature of arbitration
proceedings and the likely absence of a record, findings of fact, and conclusions of
law, the court would typically have little alternative but to try the entire case all over
again, but for the sole purpose of deciding about punitive damages." Macneil et al.,
supra note 1, § 36.3.2.2. Because bifurcation "would make arbitration where punitive
damages may be in issue extremely inefficient," it is "unlikely to be chosen by the
knowledgeable." Id. If, however, this bifurcation is chosen by the parties, that choice
must be enforced. "The preeminent concern of Congress in passing the [FAA] was to
enforce private agreements into which parties had entered, and that concern requires
that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate, even if the result is 'piecemeal'
litigation, at least absent a countervailing policy manifested in another federal stat-
ute." Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985).
48. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
49. Macneil et al., supra note 1, §§ 40.5.2.4, 40.7. Courts do reserve the power to
vacate an arbitral award when the arbitrators "manifestly disregard" the law. Id.
§ 40.7.1. But "manifest disregard" is much more than an error of law, it occurs when
"the arbitrator understood and correctly stated the law but proceeded to ignore it."
Siegel v. Titan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d 891, 893 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Bell Aerospace
Co. v. Local 516, 356 F. Supp. 354, 356 (W.D.N.Y. 1973)). "It is nearly impossible to
find FAA arbitration decisions where application of the [manifest disregard] doctrine
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substantive rights.5 0 An uncorrected error of law, by definition, de-
prives a party of the substantive right that would have been vindicated
by a correct application of the law. Courts do not correct errors of
law, that is, deprivations of substantive rights, by arbitrators, because
courts treat an agreement to arbitrate as a waiver of those substantive
rights.
Assume, for example, that A and B have agreed to arbitrate all dis-
putes arising out of their contract, which evidences a transaction in-
volving interstate commerce. Assume further that A has been
defrauded by B and that, under a proper application of the law of
fraud, B would be liable to A for both compensatory and punitive
damages. If the arbitrator hearing A's fraud claim misapplies the law
of fraud and concludes that B is not liable to A at all, then the arbitra-
tor's decision will be confirmed by the courts. Courts will confirm
what would otherwise be a complete deprivation of A's substantive
right to recover for fraud because A waived that right when A agreed
to arbitrate.
Now assume the same situation except that the arbitrator correctly
applies the law of fraud to find B liable to A but incorrectly concludes
that, on the facts of this dispute, B is liable only for compensatory, not
punitive, damages. Rather than a complete deprivation of A's sub-
stantive rights-as occurred in the first hypothetical-we have only a
partial deprivation of A's substantive rights. Just as the complete dep-
rivation of substantive rights is enforced because A waived those
rights in agreeing to arbitrate, so the partial deprivation of substantive
rights should be enforced because of A's waiver. A contrary ruling
enforcing a waiver of the whole but refusing to enforce a waiver of a
part of that whole is illogical. More specifically, enforcing arbitration
agreements as waivers of complete substantive rights-which is rou-
tine-but refusing to enforce them as waivers of part of those rights
(the punitive damages part) is illogical. 1
has resulted in the upsetting of an [arbitral] award." Macneil et al., supra note 1,
§ 40.7.1.
50. In agreeing to arbitrate, parties trade their substantive rights for the arbitra-
tor's decision as constrained by the agreement and the limited judicial review of arbi-
tral awards. Courts do vacate arbitral awards based on errors of law when the
arbitration agreement requires the arbitrator "to apply particular law and do it cor-
rectly." Macneil et al., supra note 1, §§ 40.5.2.3, 40.7.1. This is because the parties to
such an agreement have contractually reinstated their substantive rights, which other-
wise would have been contractually waived by agreeing to arbitrate.
51. Macneil et al. recognize that "[in accordance with the general principles of
consensual arbitration law, the parties may, of course, explicitly limit the authority of
the arbitrators to rescind or reform their contract." Id. § 36.5.4. Is this a waiver of
rescission or reformation in any forum? If so, then how can the remedy of punitive
damages be distinguished from the remedies of rescission or reformation? If it is not
a waiver of rescission or reformation in any forum, then there is the unfortunate pos-
sibility that an arbitrator, unable to rescind or reform the contract, could order "sec-
ond best" relief followed by a court granting rescission or reformation over and above
the arbitrator's remedy.
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Numerous commentators have worried that enforcing arbitration
agreement terms waiving the right to recover punitive damages would
permit securities brokerage firms and other parties using form con-
tracts to insulate themselves from punitive damages claims by includ-
ing such terms in the fine-print of their form contracts.5 2 This worry is
misplaced to the extent that contract law declines to enforce onerous
terms in form contracts generally because the FAA allows courts to
treat form arbitration agreements like other form contracts.53 The
FAA, however, forbids courts from being more resistant to enforcing
52. Ild. § 36.3.2; Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L
Rev. 81, 104-08 (1992); Constantine N. Katsoris, Punitive Damages in Securities Arbi-
tration: The Tower of Babel Revisited, 18 Fordham Urb. L.J. 573, 593-96 (1991); Rich-
ard J. Oparil, Preemption and the Federal Arbitration Act, 13 Geo. Mason U. L. Rev.
325, 338-45 (1990); G. Richard Shell, Tire Power to Punish: Authority of Arbitrators
to Award Multiple Damages and Attorney's Fees, 77 Mass. L. Rev. 26. 34 (1987);
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.
Reconsidered, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 953, 1007-1010 (1986); Brian R. Hajicek, Comment.
Punitive Damages in New York Arbitration: Who is Really Being Punished?, 2 J. Disp.
Resol. 361, 372 (1992). Accord Dreyfus Service Corp. v. Kent, 584 N.Y.S.2d 483
(App. Div. 1992) (Asch, J., concurring), appeal denied, 594 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1992). See
generally Perry E. Wallace, Jr., Securities Arbitration After McMahon, Rodriguez and
the New Rules: Can Investors' Rights Really Be Protected?, 43 Vand. L Rev. 1199
(1990) (discussing need for improved arbitration procedures).
53. Arbitration agreements are enforceable "save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. See Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492-93 n.9 (1987); Macneil, American Arbitration Law, supra
note 25, at 68 ("Arbitration agreements [are] burdened with whatever protections
against one-sidedness that law and equity provide[ I contracts in general, but no
more."); Note, Incorporation of State Law Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 Mich.
L. Rev. 1391, 1411-12 (1980) (Section 2 of the FAA allows a Court to -hold[ ] an
arbitration agreement unconscionable for reasons that do not arise solely because an
arbitrator rather than a judge or jury decides the dispute.").
A good example of a case involving a form arbitration agreement is Mastrobuono
v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. III. 1993), aff'd, 20 F.3d 713
(7th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 63 U.S.L.W. 3064 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1994). Mastrobuono held
that a New York choice-of-law clause in an arbitration agreement (standard form bro-
kerage agreement) constituted a waiver of punitive damages in any forum because
New York law prohibits arbitrators from awarding punitive damages. and pertinent
state law prohibits a separate court action solely for punitive damages. Id. at 848.
Macneil et al. cite Mastrobuono with disapproval as an example of the harm that
flows from allowing arbitration agreements to waive punitive damages. Macneil et al..
supra note 1, § 363.2.2 n.31.
Mastrobuono's conclusion that New York law governed the punitive damages issue
is mistaken for the reasons discussed irfra at part II. B. 2, and note 125. For present
purposes, however, assume New York law governed the punitive damages issue.
Even with that assumption, Mastrobuono may be wrong, but its wrongfulness does
not support Macneil et al.'s conclusion that parties should be denied the freedom to
waive punitive damages. The doubt about Mastrobuono is doubt about whether a
waiver of punitive damages occurred, that is, doubt about whether to enforce arbitra-
tion agreement terms buried in the fine print of a form contract. Declining to enforce
"waivers" of punitive damages when buried in the fine print of a form contract is
consistent with Section 2 of the FAA to the extent that contract law generally declines
to enforce terms in the fine print of form contracts. On the other hand, enforcing
waivers of punitive damages when there is no contract law defense against doing so is
required by Section 2 of the FAA.
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the terms of form arbitration agreements than to enforcing the terms
of other form contracts.54 If an arbitration agreement term (expressly
or impliedly) denying the arbitrator the power to award punitive dam-
ages is not rendered unenforceable by contract law then, as far as the
FAA is concerned, it must be enforced.
II. STATE LAW REGARDING THE ARBITRABILITY OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES
The foregoing analysis of the arbitrability of punitive damages does
not discuss state law on the subject. That is because the FAA "rests
on the authority of Congress to enact substantive rules under the
Commerce Clause," 55 and is applicable in state, as well as federal,
courts.56 The FAA, like any federal statute, is the "Supreme Law of
the Land" and any state law in conflict with it is unenforceable. 57 The
FAA applies if the pertinent arbitration agreement evidences a trans-
action involving interstate commerce.58 In such cases, therefore,
courts must apply the FAA, rather than conflicting state law, to deter-
mine whether an arbitrator may award punitive damages.
A somewhat different approach to state law on the arbitrability of
punitive damages prevails in the Second Circuit.
A. The Second Circuit Approach
In Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman,59 the Second Circuit applied state
law in affirming a district court decision vacating an arbitrator's award
of punitive damages. The Second Circuit did so even though the arbi-
tration agreement at issue indisputably evidenced a transaction in-
volving interstate commerce.6 ° The state law relied upon in
Commentators have lamented that courts too rarely decline to enforce arbitration
agreement terms on grounds such as adhesion and unconscionability. See, e.g., Brunet,
supra note 52, at 107 (discussing the scarcity of cases "willing to reject arbitration
clauses on adhesion contract grounds"). See also Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Ap-
proach to Arbitrability, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 1377 (1991). Stempel makes the excellent sug-
gestion that:
courts confronted with arbitrability questions should enforce written agree-
ments to arbitrate without regard to the subject matter of the dispute or to
the legal claims in the dispute unless the party resisting arbitration can
demonstrate ... that the arbitration 'contract' between the parties is voida-
ble because it was not the product of sufficiently genuine consent between
the parties.
Id. at 1426.
54. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
55. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). For criticism of Southland,
see infra note 68.
56. Southland, 465 U.S. at 12.
57. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
58. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
59. 935 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 380 (1991).
60. Id. at 517.
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Fahnestock6' is Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.,62 in which the Court of
Appeals of New York ruled that "[a]n arbitrator has no power to
award punitive damages, even if agreed upon by the parties."'
The Second Circuit's justification for applying state law in Fahnes-
tock was that the federal subject matter jurisdiction in that case was
based solely on the diversity of citizenship of the parties.' In diver-
sity actions, federal courts have applied state, rather than federal, sub-
stantive law since the landmark decision of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.65
Federal jurisdiction in Fahnestock was based solely on diversity.
There was no federal question jurisdiction.' Yet the case arose out of
an arbitration agreement evidencing a transaction involving interstate
commerce, thus implicating the FAA. This anomaly was explained by
the Supreme Court in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corporation:67
The Arbitration Act is something of an anomaly in the field of fed-
eral-court jurisdiction. It creates a body of federal substantive law
establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbi-
trate, yet it does not create any independent federal-question juris-
diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 ed., Supp. V) or otherwise.
Section 4 [of the FAA] provides for an order compelling arbitration
only when the federal district court would have jurisdiction over a
61. Id at 515.
62. 353 N.E.2d 793 (1976).
63. Id. at 794. Other state cases prohibiting arbitrators from awarding punitive
damages include United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. De Fluiter, 456 N.E.2d 429,
432 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Shaw v. Kuhnel & Assocs., Inc., 698 P.2d 880, 882 (N.M.
1985) (dicta); Anderson v. Nichols, 359 S.E.2d 117, 121 n.1 (W. Va. 1987). The Garrity
rule leads to practical problems because the distinction between compensatory and
punitive damages, while clear in theory, may not be so clear in practice. If arbitrators
know they are prohibited from awarding punitive damages, they may make larger
awards of "compensatory" damages to incorporate what would otherwise be the puni-
tive damages component. Few of these inflated compensatory awards are likely to be
modified or vacated because of the deferential standard of review that courts give to
arbitral awards. Stipanowich, supra note 52, at 959 n.23; Richard P. Hackett, Note,
Punitive Damages in Arbitration: The Search for a Workable Rule, 63 Cornell L Rev.
272,295-99 (1978). Cf Macneil et al., supra note 1, § 36.8.4 ("[J]udicial scrutiny of an
[arbitral] award of attorneys' fees may be dramatically limited by the arbitrators' fail-
ure to identify it as such. Lump-sum awards could often easily be tailored to avoid
revealing that attorneys' fees were included."). The New York Court of Appeals has
had to remind New York courts that Garrity "should not be interpreted as an indica-
tion that whenever compensatory damages are somewhat speculative" an arbitrator's
award may be vacated on the ground that "punitive" damages were awarded. Board
of Educ. v. Niagara-Wheatfield Teachers Ass'n, 389 N.E.2d 104, 106 (N.Y. 1979).
64. Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 518.
65. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). See generally Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice
and Procedure § 4504 (1982 & Supp. 1994). In Fahnestock, the Second Circuit charac-
terized Garrity as substantive before affirming Garrity's application to vacate the
award of punitive damages. Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 518.
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States."
67. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
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suit on the underlying dispute; hence, there must be diversity of citi-
zenship or some other independent basis for federal jurisdiction
before the order can issue.68
So the Second Circuit, while not denying that the arbitration agree-
ment in Fahnestock involved interstate commerce, correctly stated
that federal jurisdiction was based solely on diversity. But in diversity
cases-like all cases, state or federal-state law does not apply when
preempted by federal law.69 The weakness in Fahnestock stems from
68. Id. at 25 n.32. The conclusion of Moses H. Cone and Southland, that the FAA
creates federal substantive law applicable in state and federal courts, has been widely
criticized as inconsistent with the original understanding of the FAA, that is, that the
FAA governs only in federal courts. See, e.g., Barbara Ann Atwood, Issues in Fed-
eral-State Relations Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 37 U. Fla. L. Rev. 61, 81 (1985)
(agreeing with Justice Black's dissent in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.,
388 U.S. 395 (1967), that Congress intended the FAA to provide a federal remedy for
specific performance of arbitral awards); Rita M. Cain, Preemption of State Arbitra-
tion Statutes: The Exaggerated Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration, 19 J. Contemp. L.
1, 14-15 (1993) (criticizing Moses H. Cone for ignoring legislative history in holding
that FAA is applicable outside federal courts); Macneil et al., supra note 1, § 10.5.3
(criticizing the majority opinion in Southland that Congress intended the FAA to ap-
ply outside the federal system); Macneil, supra note 25, ch. 9-11, 14 (1992) (arguing
that the legislature intended that the FAA's applicability be limited to federal courts).
And the plaintiffs in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 628 So. 2d 354 (Ala.
1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1292 (1994), along with 20 state attorneys general, writ-
ing as friends of the court, argue that Southland should be reconsidered. See Henry
C. Strickland, Does Federal Law Mandate Enforcement of Boilerplate Arbitration Pro-
visions in Consumer Contracts?, Preview of United States Supreme Court Cases, Oct.
1, 1994, at 6.
The original understanding of the FAA as governing only federal courts was jeop-
ardized by Erie and Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), which adopted
the "outcome determinative" test that placed the FAA on the "substance" side of
Erie's substance/procedure line. Id. at 109. If Congress enacted the FAA as an exer-
cise of its power to provide a rule of decision only for diversity cases already in the
federal courts, then the Supreme Court "would have had to decide if Congress could
legislate where Erie had forbidden the federal courts to create common law." Linda
R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law,
71 Va. L. Rev. 1305, 1320 (1985). The Court avoided this difficult issue in Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., by concluding that Congress had enacted the FAA
pursuant to its commerce and admiralty power. 388 U.S. 395,404-05 (1967). In Moses
H. Cone and Southland the Court stated that the FAA governs actions in state, as well
as federal, court. While one can quarrel with the way Prima Paint, Moses H. Cone
and Southland departed from the original understanding of the FAA, it is important
to recognize that:
the anomalies [in these decisions] result from the passage of the FAA prior
to the Erie decision. The Supreme Court later construed the FAA as federal
substantive law to avoid a conflict with Erie .... Faced with a choice be-
tween two imperfect formulations, the Court aligned its pro-arbitration incli-
nation with the perceived "broader purpose" of Congress and took an
expansive view of the Act.
Hirshman, supra, at 1345-46.
69. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
ARBITRAL PUNITIVE DAMAGES
the Second Circuit's analysis of whether Garrity is preempted by the
FAA.70
The FAA's preemption of state law was addressed by the Supreme
Court in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the
Leland Stanford Junior University.7' "The FAA contains no express
pre-emptive provision, nor does it reflect a congressional intent to oc-
cupy the entire field of arbitration."'  But, the Supreme Court
continued,
Even when Congress has not completely displaced state regulation
in an area, state law may nonetheless be preempted to the extent
that it actually conflicts with federal law-that is, to the extent that
it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress., 73
The preemption question, therefore, is whether application of a state
law "would undermine the goals and policies of the FAA. '74 Under
this standard, Garrity is preempted by the FAA because it conflicts
with Section 2 of the FAA and would severely "undermine the goals
and policies of the FAA."
Garrity's rationale is that "[p]unitive damages is a sanction reserved
to the State. ' 75 "The law does not and should not permit private per-
sons to submit themselves to punitive sanctions of the order reserved
to the State. The freedom of contract does not embrace the freedom
to punish, even by contract. '76 Garrity's restriction of freedom of con-
tract could not more clearly conflict with a statute whose core com-
mand is freedom of contract for arbitration agreements. 77 "[A] state
law which limits freedom of contract with respect to arbitration agree-
ments covered by the FAA conflicts with the FAA and is preempted
by it."78
70. See Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 517 (2d Cir. 1991). cert. de-
nied, 112 S. Ct. 380 (1991).
71. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
72. d at 477.
73. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
74. Id at 478. Absent a choice-of-law clause, see infra part II.B, state arbitration
law cannot limit federal arbitration law in a case arising out of an arbitration agree-
ment involving interstate commerce. See Macneil et al., supra note 1, § 10.8.1.1. How-
ever, other areas of state law, most notably state contract law, do play an essential
role in such cases. The FAA, particularly the savings clause of Section 2, presupposes
state contract law. Id. § 10.6.2.1. The FAA is a "specialized and very limited contract
act[ ] adding to, modifying, and limiting the general contract law which otherwise
would govern arbitration agreements." Id. "The contract infrastructure underlying
the FAA is the general contract law of the particular state governing the parties' rela-
tionships." Id. § 10.6.2.3.
75. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 794 (N.Y. 1976).
76. Id. at 797.
77. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
78. Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 520 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 380 (1991) (Mahoney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Com-
mentators agree that Garrity is preempted by the FAA and recognize that Garrity
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The core of the FAA is Section 2's command that arbitration agree-
ments are as enforceable as other contracts.79 The FAA was enacted
to overrule the judiciary's long-standing refusal to enforce agreements
to arbitrate.8 ° "[The FAA] simply requires courts to enforce privately
negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance
with terms."'" Garrity defies this requirement. Garrity refuses to en-
force arbitration agreements giving arbitrators the power to award pu-
nitive damages.8" Because Garrity singles out arbitration agreements
and limits their enforceability, it is preempted by the FAA. 83
This preemption of limitations on freedom of contract works both
ways. Garrity singles out arbitration agreements by limiting the free-
allows that which the FAA forbids-the courts' attempts to weaken their private sec-
tor competitors by refusing to enforce arbitration agreements. See Macneil et al.,
supra note 1, § 10.8.1 (Garrity "constitutes a serious 'obstacle' to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress in enacting the FAA.");
Hirshman, supra note 68, at 1361 ("The policy underlying New York's attempt to
retain a public monopoly on the use of coercive sanctions-the superiority of court
adjudication-is identical to the policy underlying the old common-law prohibition on
arbitration ousting the courts of their jurisdiction."); Stipanowich, supra note 52, at
1001 ("Similar arguments [to those articulated in Garrity] were once used to deny
enforcement of contractual agreements to arbitrate future disputes.").
79. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
81. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989).
82. Hirshman suggests that "[s]trictly speaking, the New York rule [Garrity] does
not fall within the terms of section 2 of the FAA, which governs enforceability of
agreements to arbitrate, because a dispute over an arbitrator's award does not arise
until after arbitration is completed." Hirshman, supra note 68, at 1362-63. This is an
overly restrictive definition of "enforce." If the parties have agreed to comply with an
arbitrator's award, and that award turns out to include punitive damages, then com-
pelling the loser to pay the punitive damages is part of "enforcing" the agreement.
In any event, Hirshman recognizes that:
although courts will always retain authority to reject egregious awards, they
should not be permitted to vacate an arbitral award on the basis of a public
policy [such as Garrity] that discriminates against arbitration. Otherwise, lit-
igants would be able to eviscerate the protections of section 2 by waiting
until after arbitration to advance otherwise prohibited defenses.
Id.
83. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492-93 n.9 (1987) (declaring that the FAA
preempts provision of California Labor Law stating that wage collection actions may
be maintained notwithstanding existence of arbitration agreement because "[a] state-
law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate
is at issue does not comport with" section 2 of the FAA); Saturn Distribution Corp. v.
Williams, 905 F.2d 719, 722 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding that the FAA preempts Virginia
statute forbidding nonnegotiable arbitration clauses in automobile franchise agree-
ments, because "with few limitations, if a state law singles out arbitration agreements
and limits their enforceability it is preempted"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 983 (1990);
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1120 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that
FAA preempts Massachusetts regulations prohibiting securities broker-dealers from
requiring customers to sign pre-dispute arbitration agreements as a condition of open-
ing an account, because "any separate regulatory action or sanction singling out arbi-
tration agreements from contracts generally would be preempted"), cert. denied, 495
U.S. 956 (1990).
[Vol. 63
ARBITRAL PUNITIVE DAMAGES
dom to contract for punitive damages in arbitration. If a state singles
out arbitration agreements by limiting the freedom to contract against
punitive damages in arbitration that too would be preempted. 4
The implications of this preemption are profound. Contrary to
Garrity, punitive damages are not a sanction reserved to the State.
The law permits parties to contractually submit themselves to punish-
ment. 5 The freedom of contract embodied in the FAA encompasses
private punishment.
Is this good? It is if you value freedom and diversity. Denying the
freedom to privatize the award of punitive damages imposes a
mandatory rule on everyone regardless of his or her preferences. The
freedom to privatize the award of punitive damages allows parties
with different preferences about punitive damages to create different
rules. Like freedom of contract generally, it allows diversity. Parties
who feel besieged by astronomical punitive damages awards can con-
tract out of that threat. Parties who wish to be able to recover puni-
tive damages from others, or who wish to reap the gains that come
from giving others the right to recover punitive damages from them,86
can contract into punitive damages.
Garrity's conflict with the core of the FAA-freedom of contract
for arbitration agreements-is so profound that the Second Circuit
could not entirely escape from it in Fahnestock. The Second Circuit
virtually conceded that if the parties to an arbitration agreement ex-
pressly address the question of punitive damages then the agreement
must be enforced, regardless of conflicting state law:
We emphasize that an agreement between the parties specifically to
award punitive damages may well have dictated a different out-
come. The Garrity rule, to the extent that it purports to prevent
arbitrators from awarding punitive damages in the face of such an
agreement, seems to invoke preemption concerns, since it runs afoul
of the federal substantive law rules that sweep aside any state at-
tempt to interfere with the agreement of the parties.8
7
84. In contrast, a state law denying parties to any contract (not just an arbitration
agreement) the capacity to waive punitive damages is not preempted by the FAA
because such a state law is a restriction on contracts generally, not a "principle that
takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue." Perry,
482 U.S. at 493 n.9. "If the applicable substantive law, state or federal, precludes
waiver of [punitive damages], nothing in the FAA calls for allowing arbitration
clauses to constitute waivers." Macneil et al., supra note 1, § 36.3.2.2. Similarly, a
state law restricting the award of punitive damages (on some or all claims) by courts
and arbitrators alike is not preempted by the FAA.
85. See infra part III.A.1.
86. You might be suspicious of me and unwilling to contract with me unless you
are confident that you will recover punitive damages if I do something malicious to
you. Given your suspicion and my desire to contract with you, I may, at the time of
contracting, want you to have the right to recover punitive damages against me.
87. Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 518 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 380 (1991).
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In Fahnestock, however, the arbitration agreement contained no ex-
press term addressing the arbitrability of punitive damages. In the
Second Circuit's view, this resolved the preemption question. Be-
cause there was no express term in the agreement relating to punitive
damages, the Second Circuit believed that "there was no agreement as
to whether punitive damages were allowable."88 According to the
Second Circuit, "State law relating to the propriety of a punitive dam-
ages award by arbitrators in the absence of an agreement on the sub-
ject is not preempted by any federal substantive law bearing on the
subject."8 9
The Second Circuit's position can be restated as follows: The FAA
requires that arbitration agreements be enforced. Therefore, if the ar-
bitration agreement expressly states that the arbitrator is empowered
to award punitive damages, a state law to the contrary (Garrity) is
preempted by the FAA. In the absence of such an express term in the
arbitration agreement, however, there is no agreement regarding the
arbitrability of punitive damages so a state law such as Garrity is not
preempted by the FAA. The flaw in this analysis is its misconception
of the nature of an agreement. Fahnestock fails to recognize that
"contracts have implied as well as express terms."9 An arbitration
agreement may address the question of punitive damages by implica-
tion.91 And, even if there is no implied term governing punitive dam-
ages, there are the default rules against which all contracts are made.92
In Fahnestock, for instance, the relevant default rule, derived from the
federal policy favoring arbitration, allows arbitrators to award puni-
tive damages. 93 Implied terms and default rules are as much a part of
an agreement as express terms, and it is the entire agreement, not just
88. Id.
89. Id. Macneil et al. state that "the majority in Fahnestock never examined"
whether Garrity is an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives of the FAA. Macneil et al., supra note 1, § 10.8.1. I suggest that
Macneil et al., who describe the Fahnestock majority opinion as "confused," id., un-
derstate the opinion's craftiness. The Fahnestock majority recognizes that it must ad-
dress preemption but finds a way to do so while still resisting Ounitive damages
awards by arbitrators. To accomplish this, the majority distinguishes between (pre-
emptive) express terms and (nonpreemptive) other terms. Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at
517-18.
90. Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, 768 F.2d 180, 186 (7th Cir.
1985) (Posner, J.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1010 (1986).
91. See supra part I.B.2.
92. See generally Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Con-
tractual Consent, 78 Va. L. Rev. 821 (1992) (arguing that contracting parties may indi-
rectly consent to default rules). Implied terms (formerly called "implied-in-fact") are,
like express terms, a product of the direct consent of the parties. Default rules (a
subset of those terms formerly called "implied-in-law") are, at most, a product of the
"indirect consent" of the parties because the parties have consented to be legally
bound. Id. at 827-28, 860-68. (Besides default rules, the other subset of the terms
formerly called "implied-in-law" are mandatory rules.).
93. See supra part I.B.3.
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the express terms, which the FAA requires courts to enforce.9' Ac-
cordingly, it is the entire agreement, not just the express terms, which
preempts inconsistent state law.
Fahnestock should not have applied state arbitration law on the pu-
nitive damages issue. As discussed above, the FAA governs arbitra-
tion pursuant to an agreement evidencing a transaction involving
interstate commerce. If punitive damages awarded in such an arbitra-
tion are before a court, then the court (federal or state) must apply
federal arbitration law. Applying federal arbitration law means en-
forcing the arbitration agreement-all of the agreement, not just the
express terms. State arbitration law is inapplicable to the punitive
damages issue because all arbitration agreements-whether by ex-
press terms, implied terms or the default rule-address that issue.
B. Choice of Law Clauses
While state laws regarding the arbitrability of punitive damages are
(in arbitrations arising out of agreements evidencing transactions in-
volving interstate commerce) preempted by the FAA, they, neverthe-
less, may become relevant. A party may argue that a particular state's
law on the arbitrability of punitive damages applies because of a
clause in the arbitration agreement stating that disputes arising out of
the agreement are to be resolved according to the law of that state.95
This argument is based on the Supreme Court's opinion in Volt Infor-
mation Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jun-
ior University.96
94. Note that this is an interpretation of the FAA, not the creation of "federal
common law" or federal contract law respecting arbitration agreements. The view
that implied terms and default rules in arbitration agreements preempt inconsistent
state law follows from the premise that a "written provision in any... contract ... to
settle by arbitration," 9 U.S.C. § 2, includes implied terms and default rules. This
interpretation follows from "the legal realist insight that all contracts are, by neces-
sity, incomplete to some degree." Barnett, supra note 92, at 821. Because parties
drafting a contract "cannot foresee every future event or know precisely how their
own purposes may change, they cannot negotiate terms specifically to cover all con-
tingencies." Id. at 822. Thus, a written contract includes, besides express terms, terms
that can fairly be implied or "interpreted" from express terms ("implied terms") and
the default rules against which the contract is made. The mandatory rules against
which the contract is made are not properly considered part of the contract because,
in our legal system, they are not a product of consent. (Even mandatory rules could
be a product of consent in a non-monopolistic legal system in which parties were free
to choose which, if any, set of government rules they wish to live under.)
95. See, e.g., Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, 943 F.2d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir.
1991) (Cunard argued that "a New York choice of law provision in the contract
should have led the arbitration panel to apply New York law" on the question of
whether arbitrators may award punitive damages.).
96. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
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1. Volt and Preemption as a Default Rule
In Volt, the California Superior Court stayed arbitration pending
resolution of related litigation.97 A California statute permits such a
stay.98 The FAA does not.9 The decision to apply California arbitra-
tion law, rather than the FAA, initially seems to be a mistake because
the arbitration agreement evidenced a transaction involving interstate
commerce.100 Without more, the FAA preempts the inconsistent Cali-
fornia arbitration law.101 The California Court of Appeal, however,
held that California arbitration law applied because the arbitration
agreement included a choice-of-law clause, which stated that the con-
tract would be "governed by the law of the place where the project is
located."'0 2 The project at issue was located in California. 0 3 The
California Court of Appeal stated that the parties "have agreed, as we
interpret their choice of law provision, that the laws of California, of
which [the stay provision] is certainly a part, are to govern their con-
tract."' The California Court of Appeal held "that enforcement of
the arbitration agreement in accordance with the chosen California
rules of procedure does not create a conflict with the [FAA], since the
purpose of the [FAA] was to ensure that private agreements to arbi-
trate are enforceable contracts."'1 5 The United States Supreme Court
affirmed. 10
6
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the majority in Volt did not
review, but accepted as a matter of state law, the California Court of
Appeal's interpretation of the choice-of-law clause "to mean that the
parties had incorporated the California rules of arbitration into their
97. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Volt Info. Sciences.,
Inc., 240 Cal. Rptr. 558, 559 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987), aff'd, 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
98. Under California law, on petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleg-
ing the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate, the court shall order the peti-
tioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an
agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines, inter alia, that:
(c) A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court
action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same trans-
action or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting
rulings on a common issue of law or fact.... If the court determines that a
party to the arbitration is also a party to litigation in a pending court action
or special proceeding with a third party as set forth under subdivision (c)
herein, the court ... (4) may stay arbitration pending the outcome of the
court action or special proceeding.
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1281.2(c) (West 1982).
99. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988).
100. Volt, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
101. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
102. Volt, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc., v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
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arbitration agreement."1 °7 Justice Brennan, in dissent, stated, "I can
accept neither the state court's unusual interpretation of the parties'
contract, nor this Court's unwillingness to review it."'" Leaving aside
whether the Supreme Court should have reviewed the state court's
interpretation of the choice-of-law clause in Volt,"° to assess this con-
troversial case it is necessary to analyze how courts (any courts) ought
to interpret choice-of-law clauses in arbitration agreements.
Choice-of-law clauses (in all sorts of agreements) are virtually al-
ways interpreted as giving the parties' answer to the question "Which
state's law governs?", not "Does federal or state law govern?"'1 Be-
cause the clause in Volt is best interpreted as the parties' choice of
California law over other state law, rather than California law over
107. ld. at 474.
108. 1& at 481 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
109. Volt has been criticized for failing to review the state court's interpretation of
the contract. See Zhaodong Jiang, Federal Arbitration Right, Choice-of-Law Clauses
and State Rules and Procedure, 22 Sw. U. L. Rev. 159, 229 (1992); Arthur S. Feldman,
Note, Volt Information Sciences, Inc v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
University: Confusing Federalism with Federal Policy Under the FAA, 69 Tex. L Rev.
691, 719 (1991). According to Feldman:
It is one thing to say, as the Court did, that the FAA will respect agreements
to arbitrate in a manner different than that provided by the limited provi-
sions of the Act itself. It is quite another to ratify a trial court's interpreta-
tion that itself can potentially control any issue of the enforcement of the
arbitration agreement notwithstanding the general federal policy favoring
arbitration of disputes.
ld.
110. Justice Brennan stated:
It seems to me beyond dispute that the normal purpose of such choice-of-
law clauses is to determine that the law of one State rather than that of
another State will be applicable; they simply do not speak to any interaction
between state and federal law. A cursory glance at standard conflicts texts
confirms this observation: they contain no reference at all to the relation
between federal and state law in their discussions of contractual choice-of-
law clauses.
Volt, 489 U.S. at 488-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing R. Weintraub, Commentary
of the Conflict of Laws § 7.3C (2d ed. 1980); Eugene F. Scoles & Peter Hay, Conflict
of Laws 632-52 (1982); Robert A. Leflar et al., American Conflicts Law § 147 (4th ed.
1986)). Justice Brennan concluded,
The same is true of standard codifications. See Uniform Commercial Code
§ 1-105(1) (1978); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 (1971).
Indeed, the Restatement of Conflicts notes expressly that it does not deal
with "the ever-present problem of determining the respective spheres of au-
thority of the law and courts of the nation and of the member States." Id.,
§ 2, Comment c.
Id. at 489 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "Choice-of-law clauses simply have never been
used for the purpose of dealing with the relationship between state and federal law."
Id. at 490 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Robert Coulson, AAA President Says
Volt Decision Creates Setback for Arbitration, 3 ADR Report (BNA), Apr. 13, 1989,
at 136 ("Choice-of-law clauses are commonly used in domestic contracts to determine
which state law will apply, not to dilute the pre-emptive effect of federal statutes.").
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federal law, the California Court of Appeal did a bad job of interpret-
ing the contract.'1 '
One might go further and say, not only did the California Court of
Appeal do a bad job of contractual interpretation, but any court that
interprets any choice-of-law clause as a choice of state law over fed-
eral law does a bad job of contractual interpretation. That is because,
while courts often allow parties to choose which state's law governs
their disputes, courts do not permit parties to choose whether state or
federal law governs their disputes. 12 That choice is made by the fed-
eral government in deciding whether to enact federal law. If federal
law is enacted, then it governs the parties who have no choice in the
matter. Federal preemption of state law is a mandatory rule, not a
default rule that the parties are free to contract around-except for
the FAA.
The FAA is special because its core provision, Section 2, gives the
terms of arbitration agreements the force of federal law. If an arbitra-
tion agreement evidencing a transaction involving interstate com-
merce states that arbitration is to be conducted under the arbitration
law of California, then federal law states that arbitration of disputes
covered by that agreement is to be conducted under the arbitration
law of California.
Section 2 of the FAA makes federal preemption of state law a de-
fault rule rather than a mandatory rule. It allows the parties to an
arbitration agreement evidencing a transaction involving interstate
commerce to choose whether to be governed by state or federal arbi-
tration law. If the parties choose state law, then it would be inconsis-
tent with Section 2 to apply any substantive' 13 arbitration law other
than that of the chosen state.
On this fundamental and somewhat startling point, the majority and
dissent in Volt agree. The majority opinion affirms the California
Court of Appeal's holding that the parties contracted around preemp-
tion of state law by the FAA." 4 The dissent agrees that parties "are
free if they wish to write an agreement to arbitrate outside the cover-
age of the FAA. Such an agreement would permit a state rule, other-
wise preempted by the FAA, to govern their arbitration.""' 5 The
importance of Volt, then, is the unanimous view of the Justices that
111. Cf. Richard J. Oparil, Preemption and the Federal Arbitration Act, 13 Geo.
Mason U. L. Rev. 325, 335-36 (1990) (arguing that construing a choice-of-law clause
to encompass a state's arbitration law generally will be misinterpreting the contract).
112. See supra note 110.
113. C. Edward Fletcher argues that the parties' power to choose state law over the
FAA does not include the power to force a federal court to apply state procedural law
in lieu of FAA procedural provisions such as 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4, 9-11, 15-16. C. Edward
Fletcher, Arbitrating Securities Disputes 357-58 (1990).
114. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
115. Id. at 485 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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FAA preemption of state law is not a mandatory rule. It is a default
rule that the parties are free to contract around." 6 On this crucial
point (if not on its refusal to review the state court's contract interpre-
tation), Volt is laudable.
Some commentators are comfortable with FAA preemption as a de-
fault rule.117 But at least one commentator vehemently resists it.' 18
Zhaodong Jiang states that "party autonomy, whose salient feature is
to add certainty and predictability to anarchical interstate choice-of-
law cases, loses its reason for existing in the context of a federal-state
conflict." '19 This may be true if one sees added predictability as the
sole virtue of respecting party autonomy regarding choice of law. But
there is a greater virtue involved-freedom. Respecting party auton-
omy regarding choice of law, like respecting party autonomy regard-
ing any contract term, advances the parties' freedom to define their
legal rights and obligations as they wish. Respecting party autonomy
regarding choice of law is a particularly liberating application of free-
dom of contract because it allows parties to contract out of a govern-
ment's entire body of law. It converts entire bodies of law into default
rules.12° Application of the contract-enforcing rule of Section 2 to
choice-of-law clauses is entirely consistent with the freedom of con-
tract core of the FAA.
116. One might object that I am making a broader claim than is supported by Volt
or the FAA. Volt only allowed parties to contract out of the FAA into state law
"manifestly designed to encourage resort to the arbitral process." Id. at 476. Perhaps
the Court would not allow the parties to contract around FAA preemption by choos-
ing rules designed to impede and burden the arbitral process. Volt might be read to
imply that the parties cannot choose state arbitration law that "stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment... of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Id. at 477
(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). See Macneil et al., supra note 1,
§ 40.6.3. This reasoning, however, is self-contradictory. It is impossible for the parties
to choose state arbitration law that is an obstacle to the purpose of the FAA. The
purpose of the FAA is to insure the enforcement of arbitration agreements in accord-
ance with their terms. Volt, 489 U.S. at 478. Whatever rules parties choose are consis-
tent with the FAA's purpose precisely because the parties have chosen them.
A related point: Volt held that parties may contract around Sections 3 and 4 of the
FAA by choosing to be governed by state law inconsistent with Sections 3 and 4. Id.
at 476. This does not necessarily mean, one might argue, that parties may contract
around all federal arbitration law because the Supreme Court has reserved decision
on whether Sections 3 and 4 apply in state court. Id. at 477. See Macneil et al., supra
note 1, § 10.8.1. This argument fails because Volt's reasoning applies "even if §§ 3 and
4 of the FAA are fully applicable in state-court proceedings." Volt, 489 U.S. at 477.
117. Macneil et al., supra note 1, § 10.9.1 ("[Plarties should be able to choose state
arbitration law over the FAA if they wish."); Feldman, supra note 109, at 711 ("The
primary task of a court... is to interpret how the contracting parties intended to
resolve the interaction between state and federal law.").
118. Jiang, supra note 109, at 175-78.
119. Id. at 177.
120. Cf. Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 Colum. L Rev. 277, 329
(1990) (arguing that allowing parties unrestricted freedom to choose the law that gov-
erns their contract would "enabl[e] parties to opt out of any limitation [on freedom of
contract] not imposed by every state or nation in the world").
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2. Application of Preemption as a Default Rule
Given that FAA preemption of state law is merely a default rule
and that courts must enforce choice-of-law clauses in arbitration
agreements, the proper inquiry becomes "Should a given choice-of-
law clause be interpreted as choosing to be governed by state arbitra-
tion law that would otherwise be preempted by the FAA?"''
As stated above, choice-of-law clauses are virtually always inter-
preted as choosing one state's laws over another state's laws, not as
choosing state law over federal law."2 This is the best interpretation
of virtually all choice-of-law clauses in arbitration agreements because
it will undoubtedly surprise most parties and their lawyers to learn
that they have the power to choose state law over otherwise preemp-
tive federal law."2 Therefore, it is almost certainly a bad job of con-
tractual interpretation to read a typical choice-of-law clause in an
arbitration agreement as choosing to be governed by state arbitration
law that would otherwise be preempted by the FAA. More specifi-
cally, it is almost certainly a bad job of contractual interpretation to
read a typical choice-of-law clause in an arbitration agreement as
121. The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that a choice-of-law clause chooses
state over federal law on the arbitrability of punitive damages. According to the
Ninth Circuit, "issues of arbitrability ... are governed by federal law." Todd Ship-
yards Corp. v. Cunard Line, 943 F.2d 1056, 1062 (9th Cir. 1991). This is true, as far as
it goes, but it does not go far enough. Issues of arbitrability arising out of an agree-
ment involving interstate commerce are governed by federal law. Federal law, how-
ever, does not mandate whether an arbitrator may award punitive damages. Rather,
federal law declares that the parties, by agreement, may specify whether or not the
arbitrator is empowered to award punitive damages. See supra notes 30-31 and ac-
companying text. A choice-of-law clause may provide the specification. See infra
note 127 and accompanying text. Todd Shipyards, however, made no attempt to ex-
plain why the choice-of-law clause in that case did not constitute such a specification
of the arbitrator's authority. 943 F.2d at 1062. The Eighth and First Circuits are sub-
ject to the same criticism for failing to recognize preemption as a default rule and for
failing to explain why particular choice-of-law clauses should not have been inter-
preted as specifications of the law governing the arbitrability of punitive damages.
Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883, 887-88 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 287 (1993);
Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 11 n.5 (1st Cir. 1989).
122. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. Macneil et al., supra note 1,
§ 10.9.2.4, entitled "Ascertaining Party Intention Respecting Choice of Law Clauses,"
does not discuss this point. Macneil et al. state that "[g]eneral clauses providing that
the law of State X shall govern all questions relating to the contract also would nor-
mally be read to include the arbitration law of State X." Id. But recognizing that a
choice-of-law clause represents a choice of State X's arbitration law does not deter-
mine whether that is a choice of State X over State Y or a choice of State X over
federal. Macneil et al. may recognize this distinction at another point: "A cautious
reading of Volt respecting the freedom of the parties to choose state law is bolstered
by consideration of [doubt about?] ... whether the parties understood that they were
adopting state arbitration law over the FAA." Id. § 16.6.3.
123. This may change after Volt becomes widely understood. "In light of Volt, if
parties know that they can displace the FAA [with otherwise preempted state law],
then their intent to do so can be enforced." Faith A. Kaminsky, Arbitration Law:
Choice-of-Law Clauses and the Power to Choose Between State and Federal Law, 1991
Ann. Surv. Am. L. 527, 557 (1991).
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choosing state over federal law on the question of whether arbitrators
may award punitive damages. 124
Some courts interpreting New York choice-of-law clauses in arbitra-
tion agreements have concluded that such clauses designate only the
"substantive law ... that the arbitrators must apply in determining
whether the conduct of the parties warrants an award of punitive dam-
ages," not the arbitration law specifying whether or not arbitrators
may award punitive damages.' 25 This distinction between substantive
law and arbitration law gets the right result for the wrong reason. The
distinction between substantive law and arbitration law does not hold
up. Whether arbitrators may award punitive damages is a substantive
question.126 Typical New York choice-of-law clauses, for example,
should be interpreted as choosing New York law over other state law
on this question. They should not, however, be interpreted as choos-
ing New York law over federal law on this question.
On the other hand, an arbitration agreement evidencing a transac-
tion involving interstate commerce might contain an unusual choice-
of-law clause. It might say, "The law of New York, rather than federal
law, governs whether our arbitrator has the power to award punitive
damages." In such a situation, New York law would ultimately govern
the punitive damages question even though, as an initial matter, fed-
eral law is controlling because federal law incorporates the parties'
124. Like the language of the other contract terms, the language of a particular
choice-of-law clause in an arbitration agreement is to be considered by a court in
determining whether the agreement empowers the arbitrator to award punitive dam-
ages. As Judge Robert J. Ward wrote in Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,
752 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 948 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.
1991), "The primary question... is whether the parties to the [arbitration] Agree-
ment.., intended, by their inclusion of a New York choice-of-law clause, that New
York arbitration law (including the New York prohibition on arbitral punitive dam-
ages awards) govern disputes between them." Id. at 156. Judge Ward persuasively
concluded that the parties did not intend New York law to govern the punitive dam-
ages issue. Id. at 156-57. The Second Circuit reversed on the ground that the choice-
of-law clause chose New York arbitration law, including Garrity, over federal arbitra-
tion law. Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 948 F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1991).
"It is apparent from the inclusion of the choice-of-law provision that the parties in-
tended to be bound by Garrity." Id For the reasons stated in the text of this Article,
this is a bad job of contractual interpretation. Other cases (wrongly) interpreting
choice-of-law clauses as choosing state over federal law on the arbitrability of punitive
damages include: Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 20 F.3d 713, 717
(7th Cir. 1994), cerL granted, 63 U.S.L.W. 3064 (Oct. 7, 1994); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Jana, 835 F. Supp. 406, 413 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Thomson McKin-
non Sec., Inc. v. Cucchiella, 594 N.E.2d 870, 874 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992).
125. J. Alexander Sec., Inc. v. Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 826, 830 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 2182 (1994). See also Barbier, 752 F. Supp. at 156 (hold-
ing that choice-of-law clause requires application of New York substantive law but not
New York arbitration law).
126. Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 518 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 380 (1991).
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agreement which, in turn, incorporates New York law.127 This hypo-
thetical choice-of-law clause is truly unusual because it expressly
chooses state law over federal law. Most choice-of-law clauses mani-
fest no intention to displace otherwise preemptive federal law and
should not be interpreted to do so.
III. DUE PROCESS AND THE AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES BY
ARBITRATORS
While courts have unanimously rejected Constitutional challenges
to arbitral punitive damages awards, 28 commentators have argued
that such awards violate the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 29 This argument is appealing because
127. If the parties "agreed" to a choice-of-law clause (or other contract term) only
because state law required that the term be included in the contract, then the FAA
does not compel enforcement of the term. In fact, the term must be disregarded if the
law requiring it "undermine[s] the goals and policies of the FAA." Volt Info. Sciences,
Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478
(1989). Otherwise, a state law that would be preempted by the FAA could survive
preemption by simply requiring the parties to "agree" to the substance of the offend-
ing law. See Seymour v. Gloria Jean's Coffee Bean Franchising Corp., 732 F. Supp.
988 (D. Minn. 1990). See also Macneil et al., supra note 1, § 10.9.2.1 (discussing
Seymour).
128. See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, 943 F.2d 1056, 1064 (9th Cir. 1991)
(having voluntarily entered into arbitration, "Cunard cannot now argue that its due
process was denied"); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Jana, 835 F. Supp.
406 n.8 (N.D. Il. 1993) (citing cases upholding arbitrability of treble damages claims);
Kline v. O'Quinn, 874 S.W.2d 776, 782 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting due process
argument that there was insufficient notice that arbitrators could award punitive dam-
ages); Rifkind & Sterling, Inc. v. Rifkind, 33 Cal. Rptr. 828, 831-34 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994) (rejecting due process objection to arbitral punitive damages award because
defendant's agreement to arbitrate probably waived due process and because confir-
mation proceeding constituted due process in view of the fact that "only a limited
degree of state action is involved in confirming an arbitration award"); J. Alexander
Sec., 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 832-33 (assessing fairness of the arbitration); Tate v. Saratoga
Say. and Loan Ass'n, 265 Cal. Rptr. 440, 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (quickly dismissing
"suggest[ion] that to allow punitive damages in arbitration absent express agreement
is unconstitutional"). With the exception of Rifkind & Sterling and the possible ex-
ception of Todd Shipyards, these cases do not decide the constitutional issue on the
grounds discussed in this Article (lack of state action and waiver of due process
rights). The courts' reasoning in these cases, where apparent, is that due process was
given.
129. See Ira P. Rothken, Comment, Punitive Damages in Commercial Arbitration:
A Due Process Analysis, 21 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 387, 387-88 (1991) ("Punitive
damages violate due process by giving the arbitrator unfettered discretion in deter-
mining punitive damage awards."); Karen Ruga, Note, An Argument Against the
Availability of Punitive Damages in Commercial Arbitration, 62 St. John's L. Rev. 270,
283-84 (1988) ("The 'fundamental fairness' requirement of fourteenth amendment
due process ... is not safeguarded by arbitral procedures as generally employed.");
Margaret P. Sullivan, Comment, The Scope of Modern Arbitral Awards, 62 Thl. L.
Rev. 1113, 1137 (1988) ("There may well be due process violations inherent in an
arbitral award of punitive damages."). See generally Edward Brunet, Arbitration and
Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 81, 119 (1992) ("The doctrine of waiver of con-
stitutional rights is, at this time, simply inadequate to explain the absence of constitu-
tional rights in all arbitration settings."). See also Stephen P. Bedell, Punitive
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"[p]unitive damages pose an acute danger of arbitrary deprivation of
property."'130 The Supreme Court held in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg
that a state's failure to provide judicial review of the size of a jury's
punitive damages award violates due process.' 3' As there is no judi-
cial review of the size of arbitral punitive damages awards (apart from
the deferential review given to arbitral awards generally), one might
be tempted to extend Oberg's reasoning to arbitration. 32 The state
action and the waiver doctrines, however, pose major difficulties for
the argument that the award of punitive damages by arbitrators vio-
lates due process.' 33
A. State Action
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments' 34 restrict only "the State or ... those acting under color of its
authority.' 1 35  Determining what constitutes "state action" may,
therefore, be "the most important problem in American law.' 36
Unfortunately, the importance of the state action doctrine has not
been matched by its clarity. Despite the doctrine's long history, and
recurring litigation concerning the doctrine, the strong academic
Damages in Arbitration, 21 J. Marshall L. Rev. 21, 44 (1987) (stating that FAA should
be amended so any punitive damages award more than three times actual damages is
subject to de novo judicial review); Donald L. Carper, Punitive Damages in Commer-
cial Arbitration, 41 Arb. J., Sep. 1986, at 27, 33 (1986) (calling for special rules and
processes to handle punitive damages claims in arbitration); Leo P. Dreyer, Arbitra-
tion Agreements After Volt and Browning-Ferris, 38 Kan. L. Rev. 667, 719-25 (1990)
(discussing constitutionality of arbitral punitive damages awards from a -practical
standpoint" and leaving normative issues "to constitutional scholars"); Katsoris, supra
note 52, at 599-600 (proposing more extensive procedures in arbitral awards of puni-
tive damages and judicial review of them); Christa Arcos, Comment, Arbitration-
First Circuit Allows Punitive Damage Awards in Commercial Arbitration-Raytheon
Co. v. Automated Business Systems, Inc., 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989), 24 Suffolk U. L
Rev. 189, 196-97 (1990) (same); Erin Parks, Punitive Damages in California Arbitra-
tion After Baker v. Sadick: A Proposed Statutory Reform, 27 Santa Clara L Rev. 735,
757-61 (1987) (same).
130. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2333 (1994).
131. Id. Prior to Oberg, the Supreme Court had consistently rejected due process
challenges to punitive damage awards. See, e.g., TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2713-14 (1993) (affirming award of $19,000 compen-
satory damages; $10 million punitive damages); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,
499 U.S. 1 18-19 (1991) (stating that as long as a jury exercises reasonable restraint in
awarding punitive damages, due process requirements are satisfied).
132. As arbitrations commonly have more streamlined procedures than courts, it is
plausible to contend that arbitral punitive damages awards require judicial review
even more than do juries' punitive damages awards.
133. See Brunet, supra note 52, at 109-13.
134. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1688 (1988) (noting that the
Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of slavery is an exception to the state action
doctrine).
135. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423 (1973).
136. Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and Califor-
nia's Proposition 14, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 69, 69 (1967).
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consensus is that the state action doctrine has been, and remains, a
conceptual disaster area.
137
Because of the importance and complexity of the state action doc-
trine, a full-scale discussion of state action and arbitration must await
another article. It is possible, however, to take the state action doc-
trine as it has developed in the Supreme Court and apply it with some,
if not complete, confidence to the issue of arbitral punitive damages
awards.
Numerous courts have held that the state action element of a due
process claim is not present in arbitration. 38 Without challenging this
holding, Ira P. Rothken contends that awarding punitive damages
137. R. George Wright, State Action and State Responsibility, 23 Suffolk U. L. Rev.
685, 685 (1989).
138. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Air Florida Sys., Inc., 822 F.2d 833, 842 n.9
(9th Cir. 1987) ("Although Congress, in the exercise of its commerce power, has pro-
vided for some governmental regulation of private arbitration agreements, we do not
find in private arbitration proceedings the state action requisite for a constitutional
due process claim."), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 987 (1988); Elmore v. Chicago & I.M. Ry.,
782 F.2d 94, 96 (7th Cir. 1986) ("The fact that a private arbitrator denies the proce-
dural safeguards that are encompassed by the term 'due process of law' cannot give
rise to a constitutional complaint."); International Ass'n of Heat and Frost Insulators
Local Union 42 v. Absolute Envtl. Servs., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 392, 402-03 (D. Del.
1993); Cort v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 795 F. Supp. 970, 973 (N.D. Cal. 1992); United
States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, 708 F. Supp. 95, 96-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Sportas-
ticks, Inc. v. Beltz, No. 88 C 9293, 1989 WL 26825, at *4 (N.D. I11. March 22, 1989);
Joint Bd. of Cloak, Skirt and Dressmakers Union v. Senco, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 513, 518
(D. Mass. 1968); Morris v. Metriyakool, 344 N.W.2d 736, 743-58 (Mich. 1984) (Ryan,
J., concurring).
Unfortunately, the term "arbitration" is often used to describe, not only dispute-
resolution proceedings chosen privately by contract, but also various quasi-govern-
mental and even plainly governmental proceedings. See generally Macneil et al.,
supra note 1, § 2.4 (comparing private arbitration with court-annexed arbitration).
Arbitrators in these proceedings are likely to be state actors. See, e.g., Elmore, 782
F.2d at 96 (finding that while private arbitration cannot support a due process claim,
arbitration by National Railroad Adjustment Board can); United States v. Gullo, 672
F. Supp. 99, 103 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) ("If the mediation/arbitration proceeding out of
which Gullo's statements emanate had been private and not state action, the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments would not serve as vehicles to dismiss the Indictment or to
suppress statements made."); Mount St. Mary's Hosp. v. Catherwood, 311 N.Y.S.2d
863, 867 (1970) ("The simple and ineradicable fact is that voluntary arbitration and
compulsory arbitration are fundamentally different if only because one may, under
our system, consent to almost any restriction upon or deprivation of right, but similar
restrictions or deprivations, if compelled by government, must accord with procedural
and substantive due process.").
Somewhere in between private arbitration and governmental "court-annexed arbi-
tration" is arbitration by self-regulatory organizations ("SROs") like the National As-
sociation of Securities Dealers ("NASD") or the New York Stock Exchange.
Members of the NASD suggest that NASD arbitrators are state actors. See National
Association of Securities Dealers, Notices To Members No. 94-95, NASD Solicits
Public Comment on Approaches Governing Award of Punitive Damages in Arbitra-
tion (July 1994) available in 1994 NASD LEXIS 52, at *34-35 ("Federal law requires
broker/dealers to be members of SROs, and as a result, to be subject to the SROs'
rules of arbitration.... [The Federal Government] cannot compel membership in the
NASD unless the NASD provides [due process] guarantees.").
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converts an arbitrator from a private actor to a state actor.139 Courts
have not yet addressed the contention that otherwise private arbitra-
tors become state actors when they award punitive damages.' 40 The
Supreme Court, however, has spoken on a related point. In Shearson/
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,'4' the Court held that arbitrators
may award treble damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act. 42 The Court did not specifically refer to the
Due Process Clauses but did reject the notion that the "policing func-
tion" of treble damages should affect their arbitrability.'43
1. "Government Function" Theory of State Action
Rothken contends that awarding punitive damages converts an ar-
bitrator from a private actor to a state actor because an arbitrator
awarding punitive damages is "a private party exercising traditional
For an insightful comparison of private arbitration and government "alternative"
dispute-resolution, see Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected
ADP, A Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. Pa. L Rev.
2169, 2239-52 (1993). This Article has studiously avoided use of the now-common
phrase "Alternative Dispute Resolution" or "ADR" for the following reasons:
The word alternative means alternative to dispute resolution processes of
the State-the judges, juries, administrative dispute resolvers, and the like of
the State legal system. Thus the term ADR presupposes that the primary,
fundamental dispute resolution system is that provided by the State, alterna-
tive methods being secondary, supplemental, and probably suspect.
This statist view of dispute resolution simply turns the world upside down,
whether we look to history or to present socioeconomic behavior.
Macneil, American Arbitration Law, supra note 25, at 4.
139. Rothken, supra note 129, at 397. See also National Association of Securities
Dealers, supra note 138, at *34 ("An award of punitives, by its nature, is state
action.").
140. See supra note 128 and cases cited therein.
141. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
142. Id. at 241-42.
143. Id. at 240 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 635 (1985) (holding that treble damages antitrust claims are arbitrable)).
Compare Stephen P. Bedell et al., Current Developments in Arbitration: Arbitrability
and Punitive Damages, 22 J. Marshall L. Rev. 603, 626 (1992) (arguing that McMahon
implicitly recognized arbitrability of punitive damages) and Katsoris, supra note 52, at
582-83 ("[I]t is noteworthy that the Supreme Court in McMahon unanimously held
that contractual agreements to arbitrate claims asserted under RICO are specifically
enforceable, suggesting that a punitive-like damage award is available through arbi-
tration, at least for RICO claims.") and David E. Robbins, Securities Arbitration 125
(1988) ("It would be hard to imagine that if the Supreme Court empowers an arbitra-
tion panel to award treble damages in RICO cases it would preclude punitive dam-
ages in appropriate cases.") and Thomas J. Kenny, Note, Punitive Damages in
Securities Arbitration: The Unresolved Question of Pendent State Claims, 37 Cath. U.
L. Rev. 1113, 1123 n.110 (1988) ("[T]he Court unanimously held that the punitive
treble damages remedy available under RICO did not impede arbitration of such
claims.") with Ruga, supra note 129, at 282-83 (arguing that McMahon does not com-
pel the conclusion that arbitrators may award punitive damages because "it is only
when imposing punitive damages that a judge must ascertain the relevant public pol-
icy issues" and "treble damages require a finding of actual damages, whereas punitive
liability will often be imposed even when only nominal injury has resulted").
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and exclusive State power."' 44 This is an invocation of the "govern-
ment function" theory of state action, 145 one of many theories used to
find state action.' 46 Under this theory, the conduct of a private entity
constitutes state action only when that entity exercises "powers tradi-
tionally exclusively reserved to the State.'1 47  So the present test
under this theory seems to be whether punishing, or at least awarding
punitive damages, has traditionally been exclusively reserved to the
State.
Rothken's support for the assertion that awarding punitive damages
has traditionally been exclusively reserved to the State is Garrity and
Edward M. Morgan's article, Contract Theory and the Sources of
Rights: An Approach to the Arbitrability Question.48 Morgan's arti-
cle is normative legal theory-Morgan's views on what arbitrators
ought to be allowed to do-and does not support the descriptive point
that awarding punitive damages has traditionally been exclusively re-
served to the State. 149 Garrity, on the other hand, does make this de-
scriptive point. It quotes Hans Kelsen for the proposition that "[f]or
centuries the power to punish has been a monopoly of the State."'' 0
Garrity, however, misreads Kelsen.
144. Rothken, supra note 129, at 397.
145. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 466-70 (1953) (finding that association
holding primary election is state actor); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505-10
(1946) (holding that corporation operating entire town including streets, sewers, resi-
dences, etc., is state actor).
146. See Henry C. Strickland, The State Action Doctrine and the Rehnquist Court,
18 Hastings Const. L.Q. 587, 596-633 (1991) (categorizing distinct state action theo-
ries by which each of the following types of conduct may be considered state action:
(1) overt actions of state employees, officers, and agencies; (2) the creation and en-
forcement of substantive civil law; (3) state inaction through the denial of judicial
relief or other state intervention; (4) governmentally regulated private conduct; (5)
joint participation between state officials and private entities; and (6) private entities
assuming government functions or powers).
147. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974). Accord Flagg
Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157-58 (1978). The Rehnquist Court is likely to
characterize private activities as state action only "if: (1) the activities constitute a
function that traditionally has been performed only by government; and (2) the pri-
vate entity's assumption of the function substantially replaces the government's tradi-
tional performance of the function." Strickland, supra note 146, at 633.
148. 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1059 (1987).
149. Morgan contends that punitive damages claims, like treble damages antitrust
claims, ought not to be arbitrable because they are a "distributive or regulatory crea-
tion of the state." Id. at 1075, 1079-80. For arbitration "to make minimal jurispru-
dential sense" to Morgan, "the legal parameters of the dispute must not be seen as
created by the state for the collective benefit of its members." Id. at 1070. Arbitra-
tion, Morgan believes, "presumes a context of rights whose theoretical foundations lie
in direct personal interchange rather than in the state." Id. at 1059. Although not
relevant to the descriptive issue at hand, Morgan does come close to identifying the
great opportunity/threat posed by arbitration: it allows people to contract out of sub-
stantive law. Used to its full potential, arbitration could turn all mandatory rules into
default rules. It could privatize public law.
150. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 796-97 (N.Y. 1976) (citing Hans
Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State 21 (1945)). Kelsen, like political theorists
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Kelsen, described as one of "the two most prominent modem legal
positivists,"'15 maintains that "[t]he dualism of law and State is an ani-
mistic superstition.' ' 52  The "necessary unity of State and law,"'153
means, for Kelsen, that the "use of force" is monopolized by the mod-
em State. 54 The monopoly Kelsen attributes to the modern State en-
compasses the "use of force." It does not distinguish between the
"use of force to punish" and the "use of force to compensate." But
that is how Garrity (mis)reads Kelsen. In short, Garrity cites Kelsen
for the proposition that awarding punitive damages, as distinguished
from compensatory damages, has traditionally been exclusively re-
served to the State, but Kelsen provides no support for that
proposition.
What Kelsen does say-that the "use of force" has for centuries
been a monopoly of the State-is consistent with the award of puni-
tive damages by arbitrators. That is because the State does not permit
arbitrators to use force to compel compliance with their awards.
155
The State has continued to monopolize the use of force to compel
compliance with both punitive and compensatory arbitration
awards. 56
The power to punish, that is, to impose a sanction other than com-
pensation, has traditionally not been exclusively reserved to the State.
American arbitration has been in "widespread and continuous" use as
a means of deciding disputes since the seventeenth century.157 The
New York Stock Exchange, for instance, has, since its first constitution
in 1817, provided arbitration to resolve disputes among its mem-
generally, uses the term "the State" with a capital "S" to mean "government." It
should not be read as referring to one of the component commonwealths of the
United States of America.
151. Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Sci-
ence: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 91, 102 n.42 (1993) (noting
that the other is H.L.A. Hart).
152. Kelsen, supra note 150, at 191.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 21. In contrast to the modem legal state are "primitive" legal orders that
allowed for a decentralization of the use of force. Id. at 338-39.
155. See Fletcher, supra note 113, at 364 ("[T]o suggest that arbitrators may award
punitive damages in arbitration is not to attack generally the monopoly of the State in
punitive sanctions. No one suggests that arbitrators be given the authority to incar-
cerate anyone.").
156. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1988). Thus, present day arbitration is not "coercive dispute-
resolution" which, Laurence Tribe suggests, may be "inherently governmental and
therefore... a 'public function.'" Tribe, supra note 134, at 1707.
157. William Catron Jones, Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New
York" A Brief Survey, 1956 Wash. U. L.Q. 193, 194 (1956). Compare Morton J. Hor-
witz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, at 140-59 (1977) i'ith Eben
Moglen, Note, Commercial Arbitration in the Eighteenth Century: Searching for the
Transformation of American Law, 93 Yale L.J. 135, 147-48 (1983) (questioning Hor-
witz's suggestion that commercial arbitration declined at the opening of the nine-
teenth century).
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bers.158 Arbitration, broadly defined as private dispute resolution, has
traditionally occurred within countless private voluntary associations
such as trade associations, professional associations, labor unions,
churches, civic groups, and fraternal organizations. 59 The result of
these arbitration proceedings is often punishment, rather than com-
pensation. The punishment is generally the "excluding, expelling and
disciplining" of members who have violated the association's rules.
160
These private punishments, "concerted refusals to deal," are an "im-
portant mechanism by which trade associations, privately run markets,
cooperatives and professional associations enforce rules and standards
governing product or service quality."'' Trade association arbitration
is a particularly well-established forum for punishment by expul-
sion.' 62 The private punishment imposed by trade association arbitra-
tors-with attendant damage to reputation-is often "'far more
fearsome' " than the cost of compensatory damages.'
63
These examples of punishment by private arbitrators show that
punishment, generally, has not traditionally been exclusively reserved
to the State.' 64 Furthermore, even the specific form of punishment at
issue-the award of punitive damages-has not been exclusively re-
158. Jones, supra note 157, at 217.
159. See generally Note, Exhaustion of Remedies in Private Voluntary Associations,
65 Yale L.J. 369, 370-71 (1956) ("The constitutions and bylaws of private associations
generally establish internal, semi-judicial procedures by which association officials are
empowered to adjudicate disputes between members and association.").
160. Id.
161. Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy § 5.4(C) (1994). Concerted re-
fusals to deal may be challenged under the antitrust laws, but these actions are not per
se illegal and will be judged under the rule of reason. Id.
162. See generally Macneil et al., supra note 1, § 6.4.1 (reporting that a survey of
more than 2,000 associations indicates that almost one-fifth of the associations pro-
vide facilities for arranging arbitration); National Indus. Conference Bd., Trade As-
sociations: Their Economic Significance and Legal Status ch. XX (Hein & Co. 1982)
(1925) (noting that membership in some trade associations is contingent upon associ-
ate's willingness to forgo resort to the legal system and to participate in arbitration
proceedings instead); Irving S. Paull et al., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Trade Associa-
tion Activities ch. X (Hein & Co. 1983) (1927) (stating that various associations pun-
ish their members' refusal to arbitrate by expulsion).
163. Bruce L. Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State 221 (1990)
(quoting William C. Woolridge, Uncle Sam, The Monopoly Man 100-01 (1970)). See,
e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations
In the Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115, 149 (1992)("Unlike a court, the [New
York Diamond Dealers Club arbitrator] has the ability to bring unique pressures on
the losing party to pay: it can put him out of business almost instantaneously by
hanging his picture in the clubroom of every bourse in the world with a notice that he
failed to pay his debt.").
164. Under an Illinois statute enacted in 1873, arbitrators had the power to punish
for contempt committed in their presence during arbitration hearings. Macneil,
American Arbitration Law, supra note 25, at 18 (citing Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 10 § 4
(Smith-Hurd 1915-16)). Other examples of private punishment include the fining of
professional athletes by their leagues. See, e.g., Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569
F.2d 527, 535 (7th Cir. 1978) (discussing Art. 1, Sec. 3 of the Major League Agree-
ment), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).
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served to the State.165 Bruce H. Mann has shown that court enforce-
ment of arbitral punitive damages awards occurred in eighteenth
century Connecticut."6 And arbitral awards of punitive damages did
not end in the 1800s. Awarding punitive damages is a regular part of
contemporary arbitration in, for example, the diamond business. 6 7
Because punishment has not traditionally been exclusively reserved to
the State and there is a history of arbitral punitive damages awards
from the early days of the Republic to the present, the award of puni-
tive damages does not seem to convert a private arbitrator into a state
actor under the present Supreme Court's "government function" the-
ory of state action."6
2. Shelley's Theory of State Action
In addition to the "government function" theory, there is another
theory of state action that might apply to punitive damages in arbitra-
tion.169 This theory notes that when a government court enforces an
arbitrator's award (whether or not the award includes punitive dam-
ages), there is clearly a state action.' 70 This state action violates the
165. "Medieval merchant tribunals provide an ancient precedent for awards of pu-
nitive damages outside the courts of law." Stipanowich, supra note 52, at 1002 n.266
(quoting I. Gross, Select Cases on the Law Merchant 102-03 (1908)).
166. See Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before
the American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 443 (1984). During the late seventeenth
and early eighteenth centuries, parties to arbitration
would execute bonds in each other's favor for a penal amount conditioned
on non-performance of any award granted by arbitrators named in the
bonds. They would then exchange bonds and proceed to arbitration.... A
person who refused to perform an award risked being sued for the full penal
sum of the bond he had given.
Id. at 459. In the eighteenth century, bonds were
replaced by promissory notes that the parties executed in favor of each other
and deposited with the arbitrators as pledges to perform the award. After
making the award, the arbitrators could either return the notes to their mak-
ers or turn them both over to the party in whose favor they had decided.
Id. at 460. The arbitrators "could endorse the loser's note down to the amount of the
award before delivering it to the winner for collection, or they could deliver it unen-
dorsed and thereby enable the victor to sue for the full face amount." Id. at 462-63.
Awarding the loser's unendorsed note to the winner was awarding punitive damages.
Mann states that this procedure "amounted to private enforcement of arbitration
awards." Id. But, to be precise, it must be noted that the State, not the arbitrator,
enforced the loser's duty to pay his or her promissory note. i. at 469-79.
167. See Bernstein, supra note 163, at 127, 148.
168. One might quarrel with a theory under which a finding of state action turns
upon whether scholars have found historical evidence of private entities performing
the activity in question. But this quarrel involves how state action ought to be deter-
mined, rather than how it is determined, and is, for that reason, beyond the scope of
this Article.
169. See Rifldnd & Sterling, Inc. v. Rifkind, 33 Cal. Rptr. 828, 833-34 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994); Brunet, supra note 52, at 109-13.
170. Rifkind & Sterling, Inc., 33 Cal. Rptr. at 834 ("A proceeding confirming an
arbitration award and converting it into a judicial judgment constitutes state action,
governed by requisites of due process."); Brunet, supra note 52, at 109-13.
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Due Process Clauses unless the underlying arbitration proceeding-
and the court's review of it-followed certain procedures not now
generally followed. 17 1 This argument concedes that an arbitrator's
award of punitive damages, without more, is not state action.'72 But if
there is more, namely court enforcement of the arbitrator's award,
then there is state action.
When a court enforces an arbitral award it is enforcing a contract
because the parties to an arbitration agreement agree to comply with
the arbitrator's award. The proposition that a court's enforcement of
a contract is state action may seem at first to be plainly correct. But
courts and commentators have been troubled by this reasoning be-
cause they believe that, "consistently applied, [it] would require indi-
viduals to conform their private agreements to constitutional
standards whenever, as almost always, the individuals might later seek
the security of potential judicial enforcement.' 1 73 Probably because
of these worries, the argument that contract enforcement constitutes
state action has not succeeded outside the race discrimination context
of Shelley v. Kraemer.174  Although Cass Sunstein has argued that
recognizing contract enforcement as state action "does not suggest
that... the decisions of ordinary people are subject to constitutional
constraints,""' he acknowledges that present law generally does not
171. See Brunet, supra note 52, at 112 ("[T]he modern interpretation of the FAA
has created a federal delegation to private parties and encourages them to resolve
disputes in private at their expense in return for easy and public court enforcement.").
172. Rifkind & Sterling, Inc. 33 Cal. Rptr. at 833 ("Before its confirmation, the
[arbitrall award possessed the legal status of a private contract.... Consequently, the
arbitration and award themselves were not governed or constrained by due pro-
cess."); Brunet, supra note 52, at 112.
173. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1697 (2d ed. 1988).
174. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Shelley involved land subject to a covenant forbidding sales
to racial minorities. Id. at 5. When the landowner attempted to sell the land to a
member of a racial minority, the persons with an interest in the restrictive covenant
sued to enjoin the sale. Id. at 5-6. The Supreme Court held that such an order would
constitute state action and a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Id. at 14-15. According to Professor Tribe:
The Court appeared to find the requisite state action in the fact that the state
courts had indeed enforced the covenants; but such reasoning, consistently
applied, would require individuals to conform their private agreements to
constitutional standards whenever, as almost always, the individuals might
later seek the security of potential judicial enforcement.
Tribe, supra note 173, at 1697.
"[Clourts and commentators have characteristically viewed Shelley with suspicion."
Id. at 1711-12.
Shelley's finding of state action in court enforcement of a private agreement
has remained a little used doctrine of constitutional law. Neglect of the Shel-
ley doctrine can be explained by its being a case of racial discrimination, to
which the Court has been particularly hostile, and by the acceptance of the
enforcement of other private agreements as beyond the scope of the four-
teenth amendment.
The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 60, 118 n.21 (1969).
175. Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 160 (1993). "[T]he enforcement of
a contract and the availability of contract law are state action; but usually contract law
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regard contract enforcement as state action. 17 6 So Shelley is likely to
remain an aberration, 177 and its reasoning is not likely to be extended
to the enforcement of arbitration agreements/awards.178 As the
Supreme Court recently stated, "Any argument driven to reliance
upon an extension of that volatile case [Shelley] is obviously in serious
trouble.' 1 79
B. Waiver of Due Process
Even if the definition of state action is expanded to include court
enforcement of an arbitrator's award of punitive damages, a due pro-
cess challenge to such an award is likely to fail on the ground of
waiver. "The orthodox view holds that parties who consent by con-
tract to arbitration expressly waive their constitutional rights."' m8
The leading Supreme Court case on waiver of due process rights is
D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co.,'8' in which the Court held that "[t]he
due process rights to notice and hearing prior to a civil judgment are
subject to waiver."' 82 Overmyer rejected a due process challenge to a
cognovit note, which is a contractual provision "by which the debtor
consents in advance to the holder's obtaining a judgment without no-
does not offend the Constitution. The decisions of private people to reach agree-
ments are not state action at all. It is only state action that is state action." Id. at 161.
176. Id. at 73.
177. Einhorn v. LaChance, No. H-86-3406, 1987 WL 8391, *3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 18,
1987) ("Shelley was a necessary but aberrational ruling.").
178. In fact, some courts have rejected the argument that, because of the state ac-
tion inherent in court enforcement of arbitral awards, arbitration must be conducted
in accordance with the Due Process Clauses. See United States v. American Soc'y of
Composers, 708 F. Supp. 95, 96-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (rejecting this argument because
under it "all arbitrations could be subject to due process limitations through the sim-
ple act of appealing the arbitrators' decisions to the court system"); Sportastiks v.
Beltz, No. 88C9293, 1989 WL 26825, *4 (N.D. I1l. Mar. 22, 1989) (finding no state
action and confirming award). On the other hand, the court that has most thoroughly
analyzed the issue concluded that the "limited degree of state action ... involved in
confirming an arbitration award ... does require a traditional measure of due pro-
cess." Rifkind & Sterling, Inc., v. Rifkind, 33 Cal. Rptr. 828, 833 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
The court indicated, however, that the process required is only "notice and a hearing"
rather than any judicial review of the arbitral award itself. Id. Brunet, who most ably
argues for finding Shelley-type state action in arbitration, concedes that "the recent
contraction of the state-action doctrine means an uphill fight" for this argument. Bru-
net, supra note 52, at 113.
179. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 766 n.14 (1993).
180. Brunet, supra note 52, at 102. "By contracting to submit their disputes to arbi-
tration, the parties have waived their right to more protective procedures."
Hirshman, supra note 68, at 1361. Courts have not expressly addressed whether arbi-
tration agreements constitute waivers of due process rights. They have, however, ad-
dressed whether collective bargaining agreements to arbitrate constitute due process
waivers. Although there is disagreement, most find waiver. See Romano v.
Canuteson, 11 F.3d 1140, 1141 (2d Cir. 1993).
181. 405 U.S. 174, 185-86 (1972).
182. Id. at 185.
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tice or hearing. "183 Overmyer repeated the waiver standard applicable
to criminal proceedings: a waiver must "be voluntary, knowing, and
intelligently made."' But Overmyer did not state whether that stan-
dard (or some less exacting standard) governs in the civil context be-
cause even the criminal standard was satisfied on the facts before the
Court.1 85 Overmyer, however, noted that a cognovit note might not
be enforceable "where the contract is one of adhesion, where there is
great disparity in bargaining power, and where the debtor receives
nothing for the cognovit provision."'186 The Court's invocation of con-
tract law defenses as grounds for finding that there was no waiver has
led commentators to read Overmyer as "suggest[ing] ... that contract
law provides the standard for determining whether civil law waivers
satisfy the due process clause."' 87
G. Richard Shell's thorough analysis of the Supreme Court's recent
contracts jurisprudence1 88 also supports the view that the Court is us-
ing contract law standards to assess civil waivers of due process, rather
than the higher level of consent required in the criminal context. Shell
cites Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.' 89 and Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz' 90 as establishing that contractual waivers of due process
183. Id. at 176. The cognovit note is barred by statute in some states. Id. at 177
nn.6, 7.
184. Id. at 185.
185. Id. at 185-86.
186. Id. at 188.
187. Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 478,
518 (1981). Rubin criticizes the use of contract law in determining whether a waiver
of due process rights has occurred. Id. at 545. Rubin contends that to create a valid
waiver, "[e]ach party must be aware of the right that is being waived, and there must
be some process of negotiation or bargaining connected with that right." Id. at 539.
See also Brunet, supra note 52, at 108 (expressing dissatisfaction that "the present
threshold for waiving civil constitutional rights seems to be that the waiving party only
have satisfied contract law principles"); Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum,
Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57
Fordham L. Rev. 291, 365 (1988) (decrying application of contract principles to deter-
mine whether a forum-selection clause is enforceable waiver because of "ominous"
implications for surrender of constitutional rights).
188. G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 433,
477-78 (1993).
189. 416 U.S. 600 (1974). Mitchell involved the sale of consumer goods on credit
with the seller retaining a lien on the goods to secure payment of the purchase price.
Id. at 601-02. The Supreme Court rejected a due process challenge to a state court's
order sequestering the debtor's property pending resolution of a suit by the seller/lien
creditor. Id. at 619-20. The order was issued upon the application of the lien creditor
without notice to the debtor. Id. at 601-03. The Court stated that the debtor "was not
deprived of procedural due process," rather than speaking in terms of waiver. Id. at
620. Nevertheless, the waiver principle is central because under Louisiana law the
lien creditor's rights to sequestration of the property are created by an installment
sales contract with the debtor. Id. at 605-06 (discussing La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art.
3571).
190. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). Burger King rejected a due process challenge to a Florida
court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a Michigan defendant because the de-
fendant had entered into a frahchise agreement with Burger King, a Florida corpora-
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rights may involve unsophisticated parties and form contracts.19'
Shell cites cases involving enforcement of arbitration agreements and
choice-of-forum clauses in concluding that the Court also analyzes
waiver of litigation rights according to contract law standards."g
Given that the Court uses contract law standards to assess civil waiv-
ers of due process generally and contract law standards to assess waiv-
ers of litigation rights, the Court will likely use contract law standards
to assess whether an arbitration agreement waives due process rights
to certain procedures prior to a civil judgment.
Assuming that contract law standards govern (civil) waiver of due
process rights, whether a particular arbitration agreement constitutes
such a waiver is an inherently case-by-case question that will turn on
whether the party disputing waiver can prove a contract law defense
such as fraud or duress. It is, however, important to note that unless a
given arbitration agreement constitutes a waiver of due process rights,
it is unenforceable under non-constitutional law. That is because Sec-
tion 2 of the FAA only "make[s] arbitration agreements as enforcea-
ble as other contracts, but not more so. ' 193 Either an arbitration
agreement constitutes a valid waiver of due process or the Due Pro-
cess Clauses are superfluous because the arbitration agreement is un-
enforceable anyway.
tion. Id& at 487. As in Mitchell, the Court did not speak in terms of "waiving" due
process, but the waiver concept is central because, had the defendant not entered into
the franchise agreement, due process would have been offended by the Florida court's
exercise of jurisdiction over him. Id. at 479-80.
191. Shell, supra note 188, at 477-78.
192. Id. at 458-62. Accord Michael E. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the
Privatization of Procedure, 25 Cornell Int'l. L.. 51, 64 n.95 (1992).
In Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), the Court enforced a choice-
of-forum clause in a form contract (cruise ticket) requiring consumer plaintiffs to sue
in a distant forum. Carnival Cruise was decided as a matter of federal admiralty law;
due process was not expressly addressed. Id. at 590. But choice-of-forum clauses
would be ineffective unless they constituted waivers of due process requirements for
personal jurisdiction. "It does no good to preselect the forum if one party can still
contest personal jurisdiction or other venue requirements." Solimine, supra, at 65.
See also Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geography As a Litigation Weapon: Consumers, Fo-
rum-Selection Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 423, 465 (1992)
("In cases like Carnival Cruise consumer-plaintiffs should receive the full protection
that the Due Process Clause guarantees for a simple but compelling reason: the func-
tion of forum-selection clauses in consumer form contracts is precisely to reverse the
standard position of the parties with respect to forum selection."). Waiver of due
process rights would not have been found in Carnival Cruise had the standard used in
the criminal context applied because the plaintiffs' "consent was neither knowing nor
informed." Id. at 466. Accord Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372,
376-77 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.).
An arbitration agreement is "a specialized kind of forum-selection clause," Scherk
v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974), thus it is quite possible that the Court
will apply contract law standards to waiver in the arbitration agreement context. On
the other hand, an agreement to arbitrate generally waives more procedural rights
than an agreement to a particular judicial forum, so the Court may develop a different
standard for waiver in the arbitration context.
193. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967).
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One might worry that viewing an arbitration agreement as a waiver
of due process rights could lead to courts enforcing shockingly harsh
punitive damages awards. 94 The first reply to this worry is that it
finds little support in experience. "The little available empirical data
suggests that giving arbitrators authority to make punitive awards has
not resulted in 'oppressive misuse of coercive economic sanc-
tions.' "195 The more common worry among knowledgeable observers
of arbitration is precisely the opposite-that arbitrators will be reluc-
tant to impose punitive damages on defendants who could count on
no such reluctance from a court.196 In short, runaway punitive dam-
ages awards are a problem that is likely to be reduced, rather than
aggravated, by shifting disputes from courts to arbitration.
That said, suppose an arbitration agreement empowers an arbitra-
tor to award punitive damages and one of the parties to the agreement
has been ordered by the arbitrator to pay an obscenely high punitive
damages award. Given that arbitration agreements are as enforceable
as other contracts, 197 what legal reasoning might a court employ to
avoid confirming that award?
Section 10 of the FAA allows a court to vacate an arbitral award
when it was "procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means," 198
"where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitra-
tors," 199 or "[w]here the arbitrators were guilty of ... misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced. ' '2°° In addition,
all of the usual contract defenses-such as fraud, duress, mistake and
incapacity-are available as grounds for declining to enforce an arbi-
tral award.201 If none of these applies, then a court can turn to uncon-
scionability.2 °2 In short, arbitration law20 3 and contract law provide
the tools necessary for avoiding enforcement of truly shocking arbitral
awards, whether they involve punitive damages or any other sanction.
There is nothing gained, then, by interpreting the state action and
194. This worry could extend to any arbitral remedy, not just punitive damages.
Court enforcement of other arbitral remedies also might be challenged on due pro-
cess grounds. Although a full discussion of the universe of possible arbitral remedies
is beyond the scope of this Article, it is sufficient to note that the same non-Constitu-
tional doctrines available to vacate a shocking punitive damages award are available
to vacate any shocking arbitral award.
195. Macneil et al., supra note 1, § 36.3.4 (quoting Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 386
N.Y.S.2d 831, 833-34 (1976)).
196. See supra note 52.
197. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
198. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1).
199. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2).
200. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3).
201. Macneil et al., supra note 1, § 19.2.
202. Id. § 19.3. See supra note 53.
203. See Brunet, supra note 52, at 117-119 (discussing prospects for increased pro-
cedural protection in arbitration despite inapplicability of the Due Process Clause);
Stipanowich, supra note 52, at 1003-05 (discussing judicial powers to control abusive
arbitral awards).
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waiver doctrines to require that arbitrators awarding punitive dam-
ages adhere to constitutional due process standards.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article started with the core of the FAA, which is freedom of
contract with respect to arbitration agreements. The FAA prevents
government courts from weakening their private sector competitors
by refusing to enforce arbitration agreements. Applying the FAA to
punitive damages leads to the conclusion that whether an arbitrator
may award punitive damages depends on the agreement by which the
dispute was submitted to arbitration. In accordance with the usual
methods of contractual interpretation, courts must look to the express
and implied terms of an arbitration agreement to determine whether
the parties have given their arbitrator the power to award punitive
damages. If there is no language in the arbitration agreement that can
plausibly be construed as addressing punitive damages, the federal
policy favoring arbitration supports a default rule permitting arbitral
punitive damages awards.
If an arbitration agreement precludes an arbitral punitive damages
award, then, unless the agreement calls for a second (in-court) pro-
ceeding on the punitive damages claim, the parties have completely
waived their rights to recover punitive damages in any forum. This
waiver must be enforced "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract." 2' Likewise, courts must
confirm an arbitral punitive damages award if it is authorized by the
parties' arbitration agreement. In short, the FAA allows parties to
contract for the privatization of the decision to award punitive dam-
ages. This freedom allows diversity. Parties who feel besieged by as-
tronomical punitive damages awards can contract out of that threat.
Parties who wish to be able to recover punitive damages from others,
or who wish to reap the gains that come from giving others the right to
recover punitive damages from them, can contract into punitive
damages.
The FAA, like any federal law, preempts inconsistent state law. A
state law that limits freedom of contract with respect to arbitration
agreements conflicts with the FAA and is preempted by it. Garrity,
for instance, refuses to enforce arbitration agreements giving arbitra-
tors the power to award punitive damages. Because Garrity singles
out arbitration agreements and limits their enforceability, it is pre-
empted by the FAA. This preemption works both ways. Garrity sin-
gles out arbitration agreements in limiting the freedom to contract for
punitive damages. If a state singles out arbitration agreements by lim-
iting the freedom to contract against punitive damages in arbitration,
that, too, would be preempted.
204. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
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The implications of this preemption are profound. Contrary to
Garrity, punitive damages are not a sanction reserved to the State.
The law permits parties to contractually submit themselves to punish-
ment. The freedom of contract embodied in the FAA encompasses
private punishment.
While the FAA preempts inconsistent state law regarding arbitra-
tion arising out of any agreement evidencing a transaction involving
interstate commerce, it does so in an unusual way. Its preemption of
state law is a default rule, rather than a mandatory rule. Parties are
free to contract out of FAA preemption. If they choose to be gov-
erned by state law, which would otherwise be preempted by the FAA,
then the FAA requires enforcement of that choice. This choice is not
made, however, when parties include an ordinary choice-of-law clause
in their agreement. An ordinary choice-of-law clause chooses one
state's law over the law of other states, not over federal law. To con-
tract out of FAA preemption, parties must manifest an intent to
choose the law of a particular state over federal law. Although this
happens rarely, if ever, perhaps it should happen more often. Perhaps
there are other federal laws whose preemption of state law ought to
be a default rule rather than a mandatory rule. Allowing parties to
choose whether to be governed by state or federal law advances the
parties' freedom to define their legal rights and duties as they wish.
The benefits of allowing parties to privatize the decision to award
punitive damages-and perhaps the benefits of allowing them to con-
tract out of preemption-might be lost if the Due Process Clauses
were interpreted to restrict arbitral punitive damages awards. Fortu-
nately, present due process analysis does not seem to restrict such
awards. Although the state action doctrine is far from a model of clar-
ity, it appears that the present Supreme Court would not find that an
arbitrator is performing a function exclusively reserved to the State
when awarding punitive damages. And it is even less likely that Shel-
ley v. Kraemer will be extended to make court enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements state action. Finally, it appears that the Court is using
contract law standards to assess whether a valid waiver of civil due
process rights has occurred. That means that the Due Process Clauses
add nothing to the analysis of arbitral awards; non-Constitutional law
prevents enforcement of any award that would violate due process.
This is a happy conclusion because allowing privatization of the de-
cision to award punitive damages may greatly benefit parties who take
advantage of it. It may also help to defuse the controversy over puni-
tive damages generally by allowing different rules to suit different
preferences. Finally, the FAA's model of preemption as a default rule
may have the potential to do a great deal of good. If it is applied to
other areas of federal law, a new, and more liberating, form of federal-
ism may evolve.
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